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

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THE WHITE MAN'S WORK IN ASIA AND AFRICA

A DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES OF THE COLOUR QUESTION

BY

LEONARD ALSTON, M.A.

AUTHOR OF

"STOIC AND CHRISTIAN IN THE SECOND CENTURY," ETC.

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PREFATORY NOTE

THIS little work is substantially that which gained the Maitland Prize at Cambridge in 1906. Academic essays dealing with imperial topics are not unnaturally suspect; and I may therefore be pardoned for stating here that the greater part of my life has been lived in the British dominions over seas, and that my interest in the problems discussed is not by any means merely the offspring of the library and the midnight lamp. The subject dealt with is so vast that it is hardly necessary to insert an apology for the attempt to handle many aspects of it within the narrow compass of a single volume. No book could be lengthy enough to treat it adequately; and no essay on the subject, however brief, could be published without bringing on its adventurous author the charge of stepping, in some places, beyond the limits of what he is competent to treat.

CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
May, 1907.

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THE WHITE MAN'S WORK IN ASIA AND AFRICA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

§ 1. TO attack a vast group of problems affecting intimately the future welfare of all the peoples of the globe, and to deal with them in such a way as to produce even a very moderate impression of adequacy in the minds of a contracted circle of sympathetic readers, demands an intellectual equipment of no mean order. From time to time such a feat may be achieved. But the more complete the satisfaction given within the limited circle, the more probable it is that the solutions proposed—however cautiously and tentatively put forth—will be rejected, outside the special circle, as overlooking elements vital to the well-being of great masses of the world's population. Our sympathy is inadequate to the task. Our broadest-minded Utopians fail to make the foundations of their world-schemes wide enough,

or strong enough, to bear the weight of the superstructures. With patient introspection, aided by industrious comparison of such ideals as we can comprehend, we may attempt to map out the essential characteristics of human nature, and plan to satisfy what we conceive to be its legitimate demands. But the ideals of mankind are too many-sided for it to be possible for a single race to complete, even in imagination, the desired edifice. The individualism which will alone satisfy one people is rejected as reckless anarchy by another. The speculative mysticism of a nation of idealists is repudiated and ridiculed as something feeble and unpractical by a more earthy, more strenuous stock; and the energetic activity which the latter applauds is stigmatised by the more placid type as sordid utilitarianism and greed of material gain. Life without progress is a repulsive "living death" in the eyes of certain sections of humanity, while the feverish vivacity of these merely irritates their opposites or arouses in them a deep-seated antipathy.

Yet for all that, the problems connected with the adjustment of relations between race and race must be taken up and reconsidered from generation to generation. Even while we recognise and deplore our incompetency to deal with them, we are prevented by the far-reaching importance of the issues at stake from passing them over in

indolent silence. However willing we may be to restrict our outlook to domestic matters, we shall continue to find that problems of world-politics—the intercourse of white and yellow and black, the impact of Christian propagandism upon oriental seclusiveness, the influence of Moslem misrule upon commercial security, the consequences to international trade of servile labour—questions of the future relative weight of higher and lower races, of the ultimate success of civilised ideals, of the world's peace and the world's progress, will force themselves on our attention in spite of our desire to narrow our sphere of duties and devote ourselves exclusively to our own special affairs. With the progress of science, and the continuous improvements in the ease and rapidity of intercommunication and migration, we find the world shrinking year by year into a smaller and ever smaller workshop for our expanding activities. The internal affairs of each country react on the interests of all others, and we can seldom now afford to ignore any great national movement on the plea that it is a domestic matter which only a single nation has any right to discuss.

And not only must we bring up such problems for periodical discussion. Even while we are discussing, and before we have had time to frame comprehensive plans, circumstances force us into action. It is in vain that earnest lovers of the

backward races asseverate that no nation, however superior, is competent to take charge of its neighbours' future. Events have shown with irresistible logic that it is with certain nations—our own and others more or less akin—that in the main the schooling of the lower races must lie. In their own interests the North European peoples must take up this task in the ever-narrowing circle of lands. For our children's children's sake we must see that as far as in us lies we shall so play our part that the world that they will inherit may be a cleaner and more wholesome world than the world that now is. It is not in our power to rest content in the midst of the countless hordes of lower beings, steeped in foul and degrading ideas of what man is and ought to be. For contentment in such matters means atrophy. We cannot grow while the bulk of the human race is stationary. Either we and they must advance together, or we must be content to forget the idea of progress altogether.

§ 2. We are confronted at the outset with two alternatives. Either the present inferiority which we perceive in the lowest branches of the human race is nothing but the result of the long-continued action of differing environments, and may therefore (now that differing environments are with the progress of a ubiquitous civilisation becoming but a single environment common to all

mankind) be confidently expected, if not to disappear, at least to diminish indefinitely, with the passage of centuries; or else between Negro and European there yawns a chasm similar in character (though not in degree) to that which divides us from the brute creation; the lower types of mankind differing radically from our own and kindred stocks in such a way that it will never be possible to raise them to a level with ourselves.

The anthropologist can as yet offer no positive pronouncement on this point. He has drawn attention to the fact that the children of barbarian parents brought up in a civilised environment, while remarkably quick in acquiring the rudiments of civilisation, generally reach, at an early stage, a limit beyond which they seem unable to proceed. He can point also to peculiarities, such as the early closing of the sutures of the negro's skull, as indicative of greater differences than were admitted by the anti-slavery sentimentalists of a few years ago. And in general the weight of his opinion seems to favour the pessimistic theory.

But the comparatively slight advance made by a few experimentally treated children can scarcely be considered overwhelming evidence against the optimistic view, when, as evidence in the contrary direction, we can point to occasional instances of great intellectual power developed in favouring

circumstances.[1] Nor can we ignore the fact that coloured races, Indian and African, have in recent centuries, and under the stimulus of contact with Europe, made perceptible progress.

Yet it is doubtful whether the philosophic historian has any large contribution to offer tending towards another solution of our problem. For while the recent progress of these coloured races cannot but be admitted, it may prove that the limits to their possible progress lie but a very little way ahead. Could the historian supply us with a perfect picture of our barbaric ancestors—giving us, for instance, the psychological details which we miss in the brief sketches of Cæsar and Tacitus—we should have some useful material to go upon. Still better, if he could let us know through how many centuries those rugged Teutons remained in a state of stagnation prior to their stepping within the circle of light that radiated from the South. Such significant data for comparison we cannot immediately obtain. We ask questions, to which, indeed, we are frequently offered answers, but answers such as we can only partly trust. Are the Negroes of to-day morally inferior to the tribesmen against whom

[1] Unless it be the case that these exceptional instances can all be explained away by the hypothesis of the presence of some slight admixture of European or Mongolian blood. It is often confidently asserted that no pure-blooded Negro has ever shown any real intellectual power.

Agricola warred in North Britain, or who followed Alaric and Theodoric to the spoil of a decaying civilisation? Are the Indians and Chinese of to-day at all below the level of the peasants who dwelt under the shadow of feudal institutions and a priest-ridden Church in the ignorance and gloom of the Dark Ages? Given adequate answers to such questions as these, we could look forward to the future with less uncertainty, and frame our policy, educative and administrative, with surer wisdom than is now possible.

But the data are lacking. Subjective impressions and local prejudices usurp as yet the place of authoritative judgments.

Individual observers have seldom the width of experience which would qualify them to speak of more than a single people, and official information lacks that quality of sympathetic insight which could alone render it of real service in solving our problems. Glancing through volume after volume from the diligent pens of travellers, missionaries, anthropologists, and administrators, we find each new opinion cancelling that which preceded it; and it is with scant success that we seek to eliminate the writer's personal bias, and to get the right scale by which to measure the claims of optimism or despair. Now it is a missionary, more eager than befits true wisdom, exaggerating the evils of barbaric life, and forget-

ful, in his long and weary exile, of any aspects of European life except the noblest—a forgetfulness that vitiates his most cautious statements. Now it is a responsible official, proud of the reforms which he and his "department" have achieved, and prone, not unnaturally, to speak as if the advancing native had already come near to attaining the standard set before him. Again it is some lonely explorer, rejoicing at some unanticipated escape from suffering, which showed him that the black man was not in his case as black as he believed him, who insists on our seeing what he has seen through the friendliest of friendly eyes. Then it is some dealer in literary sensations seeking material for a lurid picture of the horrors of an unexplored land of darkness.

Whose opinion can we follow with least reservation?

And what standards shall we take when we measure the European against the non-European world?

§ 3. A few broad lines of distinction we may draw at the outset. The chief peoples of the Chinese Empire, if not in all respects on a level with ourselves, have at least built up a stable civilisation, and formed well-thought-out systems of philosophy and admirable moral codes. The Japanese we can scarcely place below ourselves. In India we meet with a subtle-minded industrial

population, the incongruous nature of whose actions and ideas is the despair of all observers. We cannot but admit the remarkable intellectual powers of the ablest among them (which *may*, of course, be due to the "Aryan" strain that has filtered down through generation after generation of this partly Aryan-tongued group of nations), nor can we easily deny the presence of some real moral earnestness in the intense asceticism of thousands of self-torturing fakirs, and in the deep admiration which their conduct everywhere inspires. With regard to the future of these three groups of Asiatic peoples, as also of the Persians and the Arabs—creators of noble religious systems which only ignorance can despise—it would seem that pessimism would be out of the question. Yet, strange as it may appear at first sight, those whose life-work has brought them into intimate relations with lower-class Hindus have been almost more prone to pessimism, than those whose dealings have been chiefly with the African Negro; and that in spite of the comparative mental and moral infertility of the latter.

The worker in India quickly becomes downcast on realising his inability to penetrate below the surface. He feels about him the all-pervading influence of caste and custom,[1] benumbing every

[1] One of the chief points to which trained observation needs to be steadily directed, in the case of these Asiatic civilisations, would seem to be the comparative ethical value of the communal system

effort at reform. The relatively advanced stage of the civilisation already attained, and the pride of the people in the antiquity of their religious tradition, thrust more obvious obstacles in his path than do the comparatively fluid tribal conditions of Africa. The very rigidity of the social framework, while preserving the Indian from retrogression, seems to many observers to diminish his chances of progress, so that his outlook appears darker than that of the primitive undisciplined native of Central and Southern Africa. Whether this is really the case or no is a question which can hardly be answered on the strength of individual judgments. Such a happy combination of official and unofficial methods of inquiry as would yield a trustworthy result has not yet been attempted; and until the attempt has been made we must be content to forego the right to deal freely in generalisations.

Moreover, comparison of the civilisations of East and West only too frequently takes the form of setting over against one another the very

as a means not only of conserving but of advancing personal morality. Both in India and China caste regulations, or the claims of the family, seem to take the place of a broadly based system of morals. To what extent such traditional restraints on the individual are hindrances to further development, and to what extent they may be claimed as indispensable buttresses of the existing civilisation, are subjects for philosophic scrutiny, requiring a patient gathering of evidence which has never yet been seriously attempted.

highest that the West can offer at the present moment, and some average example of what the Orient can show. Thus the outward appearance of Brussels or Brighton in the year 1900 is contrasted with that of Port Said, Benares, or Peking. Yet if we stepped back no more than a century there would be no great gap dividing these and those. "The West," which we are for ever mentally comparing with the East, means almost invariably the qualities and the institutions which have come into being in the last century or half-century. We forget the sudden bound forward made in that short period by the forces favouring public morality, decency, and order. We unconsciously assume that things were always as they are; and we explicitly declare that China, having made no progress for centuries—an assertion that could perhaps be made with equal accuracy of feudal Europe—never will progress (though the sudden rise of Japan has somewhat modified of late our contemptuous certainty). Weaknesses pointed to as evidence of chasms that can never be bridged may often be paralleled among the more backward of our own village classes, or among the masses of our nation in medieval or more primitive times. Thus, for example, Sir H. H. Johnston, mentioning a case of belief in witchcraft which made its appearance in a Christianised community of Central Africa, speaks as

if such beliefs were absolutely incompatible with Christianity, and almost concludes from their existence that negro Christianity must be a sham.[1] Yet it was but yesterday that a denial of the truth of witchcraft, and of the interference of devils in the lives of men, would, even in England, have come near to bring upon the denier the stigma of heresy.

And not only may we forget the changes in the ideals of our more articulate classes brought about in the course of a few centuries, we are liable also to ignore the fact that most of us know very little of the practical morality of the mass of our working class. "The more one sees of the poor in their own homes" (writes Miss Loane, *The Next Street but One*, p. 106) "the more one becomes convinced that their ethical views, taken as a whole, can be more justly described as different from those of the upper classes than as better or worse." In so far as this estimate is true, it means that our comparisons are for the most part vitiated at the outset by the acceptance of a non-representative standard—which is especially misleading when we are contrasting with ourselves a nation like the Indian within which classes intermediate between an unimportant aristocracy and the enormous proletariat are practically non-existent.

[1] *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. XXII.

§ 4. Every particle of evidence, favourable or unfavourable, ought, no doubt, to be weighed without bias by those whose training enables them to do so with profit; and until unanimity on the point has been reached by qualified observers, the question of the educability of backward races must not be prejudged in the interest of any religion or religious philosophy.

But though in the study we do well to remember that the optimistic alternative remains "not proven," and count it folly to blind ourselves there to a single relevant fact, nevertheless, as long as science leaves to us the least opening for continuing to hope, hope remains, for those whose part it is to act rather than to study, a paramount duty. If the possibility of a backward nation's advance is conceivable, we cannot afford to diminish, by any scepticism in practice, the inspiring force of optimism, in us and in them, from which alone the advance can come. Only if the proof of a people's inherent incapacity to rise in the scale stood beyond reach of all question and criticism, could we justifiably make acceptance of the belief the basis of a set policy, or treat with ridicule the generous labours of those devoted spirits that continue to hope in the transforming influence of Western morality and religion.

In the handling of certain problems there is

what must be called (though the phrase may appear strange to some) a *duty* of optimism. Hope, and the joy that goes with confident hope, are such powerful driving forces in the world of ethical progress that neither in our individual lives nor in our national aims can we win our way forward without them. The individual, hesitating between this course and that, lingering in thought over every obstacle, balancing the good and the evil, weighing, sifting, rejecting, needs to let in upon his reasoning the full light of day in order that he may see his path before him clear of the confusing shadows cast by indolent selfishness or by false confidence based on ignorance. But, once committed to the course he has chosen, the experienced worker takes care to sweep out of sight everything that may damp his ardour and contract his energies, as he strides forward with his eyes on the far-off goal, remembering nothing that has power to dishearten or may tempt him to waver.

So it should be with our racial duties. As yet neither historical observation nor scientific laying bare of physiological divergences can pronounce, in the authoritative tones that carry conviction, as to which of our two alternatives is in accordance with the facts. It may be that all mankind share in our wondrous capacity for progress without end; or it may be that nature has fixed

rigid unchangeable limits to the backward races' advance. Meanwhile we cannot postpone action. It is our reasonable duty therefore, as far as in us lies, so to plan out our general policy, that, whichever theory be true, we shall have wrought in our day and generation as little mischief as possible. With the charity that hopeth all things we must go forward on our self-imposed mission of elevating all that can be elevated; with the inflexibility of ultimate guardians of the earth and all the fulness thereof we must restrain and govern, checking greed and lust and violence, making for civilising influences the rough places smooth and the crooked ways straight, and never permitting righteous action to be counteracted by weak sentimentality.

§ 5. It is impossible to leave this topic without some reference, however cursory, to the vexed question of the inheritance of acquired qualities—a question which at first sight would seem to be of paramount interest in a discussion dealing with the propagation of enlightening ideas among the less enlightened races. Mr. R. H. Lock closes his admirable summary of recent scientific progress in the study of evolution with a few indignant pages, disparaging the permanent value of educational work among the lower classes. As Mr. Lock would doubtless consider his remarks equally applicable to work among the lower

races, it will be convenient to quote a passage. "The principles of heredity," he writes, "teach us that education and training, however beneficial they may be to individuals, have no material effect upon the stock itself. If they have any effect at all, this is undoubtedly unimportant in comparison with the effect which would be produced by the selection of individuals which exhibit desirable qualities. The demand for a higher birth-rate ought to apply strictly to desirables. Instead of this the cry is for education and physical training, processes which can have no permanent beneficial effect upon the race."[1] Mr. Lock enforces his views by quotations from Mr. Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* (p. xxiii). "The bubble of heredity has been pricked, the certainty that acquirements are negligible as elements in practical heredity has demolished the hopes of the educationists. . . . We must either breed political capacity or be ruined by democracy. . . ."

At first sight the position taken up by such reasoners is undoubtedly strong. But a little closer consideration will show that the argument needs much qualification. The educated parent and the physically well-developed parent set a higher value on intellectual and physical efficiency than do the untrained masses. Their children are

[1] *Variation, Heredity, and Evolution*, p. 288.

influenced, consciously and unconsciously, from infancy onward, by their parents' precepts and their parents' example. They develop in a better intellectual and moral atmosphere. They acquire a saner view of the requirements of a humane life. And though, when they in turn become parents, their children do not inherit through the physical organism the qualities thus acquired, the cumulative effect is not less real and lasting than would have been the case if the acquisitions of education were directly transmissible while each generation grew up in isolation from the earlier generation. Indeed, this course of progression is so clear and certain that the possible gains from selective breeding appear exceedingly hypothetical when set alongside of it. Borrowing the biologist's language, we may describe the case as one of progressive modification of the environment, each generation being brought, during its most susceptible age, into progressively more stimulating surroundings; and though, if a child of our own race and times were separated at birth from its parents, and by some miraculous process reared in absolute solitude in a Robinson Crusoe islet, all the consequences of centuries of education would be seen to be negligible, and the progress be triumphantly declared illusory, none the less it remains true that under normal conditions the progress is as real, rapid, and effective as if the

Lamarckian theory of use inheritance stood beyond challenge. The conditions governing the transmission of moral qualities are only in part the same as those governing the inheritance of physical qualities.

CHAPTER II

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO THE LOWER RACES

§ 6. PRELIMINARY, however, to the question of how we shall bring our higher ideals to influence the thought and practice of Asia and Africa is the more fundamental consideration—In what does the superiority of those ideals essentially consist? In what respects do they differ from the ideals of the other two continents?[1]

It is almost a platitude to point out that in drawing such comparisons it is necessary to avoid confusing differences of average conduct and practice with differences of ideals. Thus the missionary, working in a land where even the people's vices are new and strange to him (and therefore doubly abhorrent), and coming gradually to forget the evils of English lower-class city life, tends to contrast an idealised Christendom and the highest teaching of Christianity with the vile-

[1] Theological considerations have been subordinated as far as possible in the treatment of this and similar questions.

ness of the darkened lives around him; while an author like Mr. H. Fielding Hall, presenting a more or less idyllic view of Burmese character, with frequent reference to the august teachings of the Buddha, sets over against these the faulty practices of the West. Such authors miss their aim; for the reader cannot but feel that the comparisons are faulty and misleading.

But we must guard equally against the opposite extreme of treatment. Ethical theory and ethical practice cannot be cut asunder as though they were unrelated things, least of all where national ideals and national conduct are concerned. If there appears on the surface some unresolved inconsistency which cannot be dismissed as insignificant or transitory, either the ideals have been fundamentally misstated or the conduct has been misinterpreted. There can be no wide and abiding discrepancy.

Yet on the surface there is, in the case of European practice and religious theory, a wide discrepancy, such as has exposed us to the mockery of the more fiery of our own reforming spirits—our Ruskins and Carlyles, to mention only the greatest names—and, at the same time, rouses distrust and scorn among our Oriental observers. In the Westerner's character there are certain underlying tendencies which are liable to appear in their most repulsive crudity in the actions of

the gain-seeking man of commerce; and it is in Eastern lands that persons of this type give expression to them most openly and cynically, feeling themselves emancipated there from the repressive influences of a partially Christianised environment. Now, it is the trader and the missionary of whom (apart from officials and military men) the Oriental has the opportunity of seeing most. And the more subtly acute minds of Asia are quick to feel the inconsistency between the ideal as it is usually enunciated by the preacher and nominally accepted by the merchant, on the one hand, and, on the other, those sub-conscious forces which in fact govern the actions of the Western world as a whole. Even in the missionary, when it comes to questions of practical policy, they observe signs of his being at heart inclined to accept a robuster, less idealistic code than he officially upholds. Only rarely is his conception of the duty of man so carefully formulated as to be in accordance with the principles on which his life is lived.

We have here an inconsistency which for the most part escapes the notice of the Christian West; or at the best is explained as a mere falling short, in practice, from our theoretical ideal. No explanation could be more flimsy. It is a profound, deeply based inconsistency, which will not disappear till the more earnest of Western

thinkers have restated the ideals of Christianity in such a way as to make the statements at once acceptable to the national conscience and true to what is best in the principles of Western action. The ill-formulated ideals of a defective Christianity, and the distorted practice resulting from a latent consciousness that the ideals are "impracticable," are equally the causes of the unhappy discrepancy. The ethical views must be reformulated in the light of our own practice (which after all cannot be widely at variance with our ideals—seeing that they that hunger and thirst after any quality are assured of attaining it), and the practice will have to be modified and purified till it accords with a theory that is no longer fundamentally at variance with the Western man's view of his work in the world.

If we proceed with this task with any measure of success, the alien minds whose various attitudes of hostility or of mockery, of ironical contempt or of disgust at our "hypocrisy," have forced us to a reconsideration of our position, and a fuller analysis of our principles, will have performed for us no slight service.

What is needed is a clear conception of what we, the higher races, are aiming at; what it is that we stand for. Our deeper thinkers, and our spiritually-minded religious leaders, have no doubt formulated, more or less to their own satis-

faction, the principles according to which their individual lives are to be regulated. But the various formulæ clash, and none of them, perhaps, is an adequate expression of what we may call the racial instinct in matters of right and wrong. None of them gives a satisfactory explanation of how and why the Western peoples act as they do, and play the part which they are playing in contemporary history. The moralist has his own scheme of life for which he endeavours to find acceptance among the members of his own race; and if he is also a missionary he will endeavour to impose similar moral teaching on the people he is evangelising. But he will probably (without intending to mislead) put it forward as containing the core of Christian doctrine, and as being the accepted code of Christian lands. If his code is a high one, and his life strictly governed by it, his teaching will be no doubt beneficial—in the same way as it would have been, had his work been done among the lowest classes of his own nation—but the influence of personal idiosyncrasies tends to produce a confusion of ideas in the minds of those whom he seeks to win over.

Indeed, every teacher who calls himself Christian has a natural tendency to name everything that he approves "Christian," without regard to the question whether his own ideals do or do not coincide with the ideals either of contemporary or of

primitive Christianity. The very claim of Christianity to be the one exclusively true religion, containing the sole set of infallible ethical principles, makes it logically possible to pass in either direction, from the declaration that something is admittedly part of Christianity to the declaration that it ought to be, and is, above criticism, or from the assertion that something is demonstrably admirable to the assertion that it must therefore be an integral part of Christianity. The former line of argument may be used to justify religious persecution; while the latter with its phrases about the "anima naturaliter Christiana" disarms the dialectical opponent of Christianity by declaring him to be not an enemy, but a friend who has mistaken his uniform.[1]

Unfortunately the factors superficially most in evidence in the progress of the Western world are principles diametrically opposed to the professed ethics of East and West alike. Repulsive self-assertion, reliance on material force, the exaltation of mere wealth, the disappearance of all self-respecting serenity in a "cupidinous ravishment

[1] As an instance of a similar tendency among adherents of other religions, may be quoted the words of a Hindu writer, who says of Rammohan Roy (the founder of Brahmoism) that he "had no intention of denouncing Christianity, for, like all true believers in the one universal religion of God, he saw true Hinduism in the pure, simple, yet grand teachings of the prophet of Nazareth" (B. C. Mahtab, *Studies*, p. 15).

of the future," the all-pervading ambition not of filling more completely the place in which each man is set by birth and circumstance, but of climbing by any and every means into some other which shall be more lucrative—these are probably the characteristics which the thoughtful East associates more especially with the civilisation of Europe.[1] The good qualities of which they are the evil exaggerations either escape notice or are looked upon as fortuitous accompaniments of the repulsive traits, like the courage that goes with the lion's ferocity. The strenuous self-devotion which yet recognises a prime duty in self-development; the unrelaxing prudence that sees life as a whole and concerns itself with sagacious provision for future needs; the respect for purposeful industry—all of them qualities that easily pass into forms which merit condemnation—are scarcely seen by the Oriental amid the fantastic complexity of Western life; while—in the case of the Hindu, if not of others—the benumbing influence of pantheistic views of the world and a super-subtle metaphysic, combined with the experience of centuries of a stagnant civilisation, prevent him from adopting either the stern view of personal duty, or the confident hope in the practicability of moral progress, which are essential elements in the Christian attitude towards life.

[1] Cf. Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson's *Letters from John Chinaman.*

Had the Oriental mind a native tendency to honour the same virtues as we, it would already have attained at least an equal share in their possession. The East has sought after other things. Nor is it likely to alter its scale of ultimate values as the result of a first hasty observation of European wares. The Western ideals require to be both clearly formulated and perseveringly upheld in the lives of those Westerners with whom the Orientals come most into contact, and observable also as the underlying postulates and assumptions of Western literature and national activity, before there is a probability of their being even partially accepted. We must set our own house in order—as well by reformulating the principles on which we act, as by reforming the manner of our action—before the Western theory of life can become even a candidate for the control of moral action in the East.

§ 7. How then shall we formulate our racial duty in the present, the duty of acting in such ways that the world of the future may be ever more like that kingdom of heaven into which it should be our earnest desire to transform it? And in so far as our purpose demands giving, what part more especially of our Teutonised Christianity shall we chiefly seek to impart to the less developed nations—the distinctively Teutonic, or the distinctively Christian elements?

But our programme does not necessarily limit itself to giving. It is we ourselves who wish to grow, and in growing to receive everything of good that the peoples of other continents can bring to us. For whether we look back along our Teutonic line of ancestry to the worshippers of the gods of a vanished Valhalla, and say that we learned and gained by absorbing what Roman, Greek, and Hebrew knew better than we; or back, instead, along the line of our more spiritual ancestry, and say that Christianity gained and learned from each strong stock with which successively it came in contact; in either case we cannot complacently turn indifferent eyes away from the alien races and all their works, declaring dogmatically that we have nothing further to receive from these.

Contact with our less developed kindred is already revivifying our sciences and our philosophy, and giving us, through the study of comparative religion and of anthropology generally, a clearer insight into our own mental characteristics and religious psychology. Nor is it only through the reflex action of wider and truer scientific knowledge of peoples in whom we believe are reproduced the characteristics of the infancy of our own stock, that we may expect our ethical conceptions to be enriched and expanded. It is not lightly to be forgotten that the spirit of

the East is in many ways more akin than our own to the spirit of primitive Christianity. And though we may not desire definitely to retrace our steps to the extent of placing ourselves on the same level with our spiritual forefathers, we may yet a second time discover that we have something to learn[1] from the patient submissiveness and passivity of an Oriental world that despises our fretful activity; while from the furthest of Eastern peoples we may have still to study how to improve on our slipshod application of our own cherished ideals, remodelling our conceptions of strenuous endeavour in the light of the lessons taught us by Japanese military triumphs, and gaining perchance new light, likewise, on the moral function of the cult of beauty, as we observe the tranquil serenity of Japanese stoicism.[2]

[1] "Every nation has its contribution of moral qualities to give to the Catholic Church. I am persuaded that the view which makes the Greek, Latin, and Gothic races to have exhausted all that is of essential importance to the rehabilitation of humanity is a profound error. I believe that the Hindoo, for instance, has many noble qualities; lofty idealism; singular strength of self-devotion; marvellous power of endurance; along with natural aptitude for many of the gentler virtues, as meekness, tenderness, delicacy—virtues which we may not rank very highly, but on which our Saviour has stamped His indelible approbation in the Sermon on the Mount" (Dr. Kay, quoted in Frere's *Indian Missions*, p. 82).

[2] Cf. the editor's article in the *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1905, dealing with Japan; and Mr. P. C. Moxom's in the *North American Review*, August, 1906, "The Trial of Christianity."

By patient observation and careful comparison we may hope to gain clearer conceptions as to what is essential in our ethical ideals, and continue in the future that process by which Christianity has evolved in the past—remodelling, rejecting, or preserving the multiform contributions of diverse ethical environments. It is important for our own philosophic growth to discover how far existing forms of Protestant Christianity are ethnic, and how far potentially universal expressions of the spiritual needs of humanity. If the religious outlook which we urge the Oriental to substitute for his own is persistently rejected by him, it must be that we have offered him something which is not unqualifiedly universal in its application, but tainted with the admixture of non-essential racial elements; and these elements it may repay us, spiritually, to isolate and analyse.

By the painstaking study of the working of Eastern minds upon the ideals that are set before them, we may yet learn much as to the many-sidedness of human nature, and in doing so, may further the evolution of our own religious views. As the Teutonic mind rejected such elements in primitive Christianity as the Oriental glorification of celibacy—a moral bias very noticeable in Apostolic and early post-Apostolic thought—so we may find that the Oriental in his turn will

reject, and not without reason, elements which we believed essential to a developed Christianity.

§ 8. Such study is our privilege. Our duty as teachers is less simply formulated. The Christian must ask himself whether it should be our prime aim to give back to the Orient a Christianity as like the Christianity of early days as possible; eliminating deliberately all that is late, Northern, Teutonic, in the hope that therein it will find what is fully congenial to its own spirit; or whether we should rather hold insistently before the mind of Asia *all* our ideals, laying stress on what is modern and savouring of Teutonic individualism, paying little regard to what is or is not distinctively Christian, and allowing the pupil-nations to absorb what they will, and reject what seems to them unworthy.

The attempt to spread everywhere distinctively European ideas is what appeals most directly to the unreflecting mind as a noble and a satisfying task. And there is much to be said in favour of such a policy; though if undertaken in a parochially proselytising spirit it is likely to lead to disappointment and impatience. For it is easy to drift into the habit of thinking that everything must be good *per se* which is good for *us;* and also, in looking back on the past, to assume that what there is of good in us and ours is in no way the product of circumstance,

but due entirely to inherent superiorities in our racial character which the subject peoples would do well to admire and humbly aim at copying. Sir H. H. Johnston, a far-sighted and thoughtful critic of missions, puts this view of racial superiority very strikingly. "Like many others" (he writes, *Fortnightly Review*, April, 1889), "I am disposed to think that had Charles Martel *not* conquered at Poictiers, and the Saracen force had crossed our Channel and added Great Britain to the Mohammedan Empire; had the Quran been expounded from Oxford and our ancestors been forcibly converted to the tenets of Islam as they were framed in the eighth century, the result in the nineteenth century would not have greatly differed from the existing social condition and development of society. The Mohammedanism of Britain would have been purified of its grossness and cruelty in the austere but tender north; the contradictions and puerilities of its dogmas would have been gradually evaded, ignored, or pared away by the logical British minds — in short, the result would have been that the Islam of England would have differed as widely from the intolerable Mohammedanism of Arabia and Central Asia as our modern Christianity differs from the faith of Abyssinia or Brazil. It is the races of Northern and Central Europe who have made Christianity what it is. Left to be de-

veloped by Syrians, Arabs, or Persians, the faith of Christ would have degenerated into the gross, bloody, sensual creeds of nearer Asia and the Mediterranean basin; the Greeks would have—have in fact—distorted it into an elaborate hocus-pocus of gorgeous, silly fetichism; in the minds of Indians and Chinese it would have become but an earlier (*sic*) Buddhism — a moony, transcendental, contemplative faith of praying-wheels, meritorious immobility, vicarious hymns bellowed through brazen trumpets, abstract principles, theoretical philanthropy, and metaphysics run mad. *Nirvana* is a conception of beatitude which could never have originated in, nor have been tolerated by, the active, energetic, discontented, progressive European."

There is much that deserves consideration in this vigorous paragraph, but it does not necessarily set forth the whole truth, or even the most important aspects of the truth.

As we look back over the marvellous history of Northern Christianity, we cannot but be struck by the remarkable compositeness of its character, the number of originally alien elements that it has in the past been able to absorb, remodelling, rejecting or preserving the diverse moral and religious ideals that have come within its range at one and another stage of its development. Springing into existence on the partly Hellenised

soil of Palestine, it had behind it the many centuries of Hebrew moral tradition; and with this Hebraic morality, though not without preliminary struggle and schism, it quickly co-ordinated all that it found adaptable in pre-Christian Greek philosophy. Moving westward, the growing power fixed its visible central throne in the imperial city of law and ordered strength, and caught from its new surroundings the strong legal character that was to remain with it through the age that we know as medieval. But, composite in its origin as Roman Christianity was, it was too deeply tainted (if the word be not too strong) with modes of thought peculiar to the South to be able to satisfy the religious aspirations of more than a few of European peoples, and those by no means the most progressive. The vigorous individualistic temper of the Northern nations who had framed the warrior legends of Wodin and Thor was not to be permanently subdued into Southern moulds. The North revolted, and Protestant Christianity took on a new shape, more suited to the rebellious genius of the energetic Teuton spirit. The new spirit was a spirit of growth. In vain the earliest Protestants sought to set bounds to further development and to shackle the growing forces in the chains of contemporary dogma. Protestantism continued to develop and expand. Old statements of dogma might be re-

tained (in the same conservative spirit in which English constitutional forms have been retained through centuries of widely differing political character), but the ideas embodied in the dogmas have changed and continue changing. For Christianity is no dead thing, but a living plant, growing, and destined to grow as long as human nature and national religious ideals are capable of further development. The old names may remain, and do good service by remaining—helping to conserve that continuity in progress which makes progress real, and keeping alive a spirit of loyalty to the past which plays no slight part in aiding religious development. But the dogmatism of earlier centuries is giving place to a theology, bold, alert, and aggressive, going forth conquering and to conquer.

Thus has evolved our modern Protestant Christianity—a thing so different from the Southern and Eastern forms of religion that retain the same name of Christian, that it takes more than a passing glance to make out what it is that they have in common. Composite, almost as human nature is composite, acted on through century after century by numberless conflicting currents of thought, it is hard for us to question that, if not the last word in the spiritual history of humankind, it contains at least the essential features of the world-religion of the future.

But it is assuredly not the last word. Rather than crudely copy the dogmatic tone of those who believe that Christianity has already attained its zenith, let us adopt the attitude of which the following may be taken as a representative statement. In his *The Universal Elements of the Christian Religion*, Dr. C. C. Hall writes as follows (pp. 88, 89): "If it had been possible for one set of men to legislate the form and contents of religious thinking in a manner permanently adequate for all Christian experience, our conception of the vastness of the revelation of God in Christ would shrink. But this never has been possible. The successive theological reinterpretations have borne witness to the sincerity, and often to the insight of those that framed them. For those who used them they have appeared to have a relative sufficiency. As presentments of Christian thought, and interpretations of revealed truth, they have been honoured of God and serviceable to man. But their noblest quality has been, not their relative adequacy, but their absolute inadequacy; not their direct witness to certain aspects impressing the minds of those who framed them, but their indirect witness, through their insufficiency for other minds, to the immensity of the scope of the manifestation to the world, of God in Christ. Had Europe slept in ignorance beneath the limited view of God and His universe that prevailed in

the age of Hildebrand, and was not materially enlarged by the Council of Trent, one might conclude that Christianity is but an ethnic faith. But with the rebirth of learning and the emancipation of thought came the rolling back of clouds, the uncovering of landscapes, the multitudinous self-fulfilments of God; and the students of truth awoke; and every one had a doctrine, a tongue, a revelation, an interpretation; and lo! the wideness of God's mercy was as the wideness of the sea—and the love of God was broader than the measure of man's mind."

§ 9. Yet generous and broad as its tolerant training has been, it remains true that in the school of Protestant Christianity none of us has acquired the breadth of view necessary for the just estimation of alien ideals of life. Our moral education remains largely a matter of peremptory instructions to abstain, unreasoningly, from this or that line of action, as being universally repugnant to moral agents, abhorrent to good taste, or incompatible with "good form." The faintest attempts to argue on such points are promptly frowned down, and the more inquiring temperaments quickly learn the lesson that to propose unbiassed discussion of this and that is to invite a painful ostracism. Certain topics, or certain ways of approaching particular topics, are sternly tabooed. Thus we are rapidly moulded into

bundles of prejudices and rendered unable to breathe freely in more than a single "psychological climate." By having the conclusions which were slowly formed by our ancestors hardened into the framework of our moral being we are saved the often wasteful, but often beneficial, trouble of investigating the greater number of moral laws for ourselves. Psychological and physiological habitudes and aptitudes are firmly built into us by this excellent discipline. We are forced to grow, more or less, in the directions which the community to which we belong approves. The possibilities of variation are reduced within narrow bounds for all of us, by limitations which on the whole may be good but occasionally prove seriously harmful.

The training is beneficial, almost entirely beneficial, as long as we live our lives within the ancestral environment. But environments change. Horizons grow; and the world contracts. The criteria of right and wrong that had a relative adequacy as long as we did not step beyond the tribal or national lines, fail us when we seek to apply them in other surroundings. Our judgments, for instance, of the "lower races" are liable to go madly astray. Their social institutions seem at first sight to serve no purposes which are not unutterably bad. The indifference of the alien mind in the presence of a

thousand and one of our petty conventions seems evidence of nothing but innate depravity. In our haste to condemn him we jumble together with more serious matters his violations of our ceremonial code (questions of sabbatarianism, clothing, conventional courtesies involving polite untruthfulness, artificial limitations on what may be mentioned and what not), and often fail utterly to distinguish such matters from the essentials of moral rectitude. Meanwhile, he too is applying the same process of judgment, and weighing in the balances *our* shameless misdoings.[1] And only very slowly, and very partially, if at all, do we come to a juster appreciation of ourselves and of him, and learn to discriminate between trifles and serious matters. Our early training, while keeping us from certain lines of action that our own people disapprove, has deprived us of the power to judge justly, outside our own community, concerning everything connected with these forbidden courses.

Moreover, when we compare our own social and political institutions as a whole with those of the stranger, nothing is more natural than to dwell

[1] Dr. Oldfield, for instance, remarks (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1903, "The Failure of Christian Missions in India") that he has everywhere among Hindus "found the same deep-seated belief that the *practice* of Christian missioners was so much lower in the matter of actual cleanliness and humaneness in eating and drinking and bathing, that it was felt that it would be actual *degradation* to become a Christian." Cf. also Sir F. S. Lely's *Suggestions for the Better Governing of India*, passim.

on the obvious good points of our own world and to look upon the accompanying evils as unavoidable disadvantages not to be estimated as corollaries of the system as a whole. We are quick, for instance, to feel and express exasperation at the shiftlessness, the improvidence, the lack of industry which we observe among backward races. They are content with so little in the way of material goods; their stagnation is contemptible and disgusting; and so forth, and so forth. But we forget, as we pass this judgment, that such peoples often preserve in large measure the personal freedom and manly self-respect and self-reliance which great masses of our own producing "hands" are compelled to forego. We are trained to a certain blindness as regards particular elements of our social environment, and we cannot understand the corresponding blindness of others. And so it happens quite naturally that "the inhumanity of the Chinese, not being the inhumanity of London, Paris, Berlin, or New York, can always be recited to arouse crowds in those cities to a righteous horror of the 'heathen Chinee'—just as the Western civilisations can be described in Pekin from the point of view of the cultured Chinaman, and be made the starting-point of a Boxer movement."[1]

[1] Mr. J. R. Macdonald in the *Journal of Ethics*, July, 1901.

§ 10. But why, it may be asked, is it of consequence to reach correct estimates of the relative ethical position, in theory or in practice, of the nations which we are desirous of elevating? Seeing that we desire to elevate them, what matters it to what height precisely they have already attained? Such considerations, it may be urged, are for the study only. What we need is incentives to more strenuous missionary activity, and the blacker the picture we draw of the inferior people, the more likely are we to get the needed work done.

Such an attitude, with regard to the settled civilisation of Asia at any rate, betrays a most serious ignorance of the issues at stake. Great numbers of the people of India are steady readers of what is written in England about their country. To indulge in ignorant statements about their national religions is, as Dr. Oldfield says, to build up against the missionaries' creed "an impenetrable wall of silent pity."[1] To deal similarly with the national character is to rouse something worse than contempt. What Dr. Oldfield writes of the English missionary may not be at all typical of the broader-minded workers of the present day, but in so far as it is, or has been, true, it would account for the extinction of much sympathy. "They see that to get funds for

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1903.

missionary work it is necessary nowadays to use startling colours, and lay them on thickly, with the result that to English audiences missionaries frequently paint Indian life in absolutely false colours. They tell tales which are quite true indeed, but which are given as typical illustrations of Indian life, whereas they give as false a picture as if a Hindu working in our East End slums, with all their filth and overcrowding, and drunkenness and debauchery, and foul language and immorality, were to go back and relate stories from his work there as if these stories were typical of English life!"

Tactlessness, such as this, may be found outside the sphere of mission work. It detracts largely from the efficiency of our educational and administrative work alike. Here is a passage from the pen of a sympathetic ex-civilian. "There is many an Englishman who in the way of duty would—in time of trial does—die for the people, who will not take the trouble to be civil to them, or to learn their little turns of talk, of social rule, of religious observance. Naturally he fails to attract cordial feeling, for to most men it is easier to 'love them that hate you' than them that despise you. Thus the native Chief who has to be pressed by the Political Agent to feed his people in famine, or who runs away from them in their extremity to a happier

clime, wins more affection than the dogged Englishman who stands by them. For the Chief knows them, and at least is never suspected of laughing at them, though he may be hard on them. Even in his selfishness he is intelligible and touches a common chord" (Sir F. S. Lely, *Suggestions for the Better Governing of India*, p. 8).

What is evidently needed in the work of educationist and administrator alike is a steadfast attitude of sympathy, combined with a wholesomely stern determination never to blink facts or indulge in weak-minded self-deception with regard to results attained or immediately attainable. Even the question of justice in our administrative dealings hardly takes precedence of the need for sympathetic treatment. For few non-European peoples have any conception of what we mean by such moral qualities. One writer on Indian matters goes so far as to declare that according to the native's view of what constitutes a strictly upright administration of justice, it consists in an unbiassed tendency to decide in favour of the litigant who bribes highest, together with a conscientious regularity in returning their unavailing gifts to those whom the judge has sent empty away; while of both the Indian in India and the Negro in America it is asserted that they go to law habitually in the mental condition of mere

gamblers. Our European notions with regard to such matters are too high above their heads for them to grasp. "To say nothing of missionary experience, it is the cross of every official who represents the English in India that the longer he lives in the country, the less, in innumerable ways, does he believe that he will ever understand it: that to the last he will be irritated and disappointed that his motives and his principles, his most treasured theories of justice, and his most disinterested executive acts are accepted by the people whom he rules as the crotchets—inevitable, of course, and happily, beneficent on the whole—of people whose thoughts and whose ways form a mysterious dispensation of Providence, to be endured since it cannot be amended. As a fervently imaginative child looks on at the ways of its elders, and wonders how people who might be playing spend their time in reading books or paying visits, so a Hindu surveys the English system, administrative, judicial, financial, and marvels how it ever came about that human beings should behave so unaccountably. . . . If only they would let us alone—would see that what commends itself to them is put out of court for us by just what they think its advantages!—this perhaps would sum up, to a great extent, the attitude of the Indian mind to Europeans and to everything they do."[1]

[1] "Missions to the Hindus," *Church Quarterly*, October, 1902.

Mere uprightness of dealing is not, therefore, a quality which by itself will compensate for a general moral aloofness. An assumption of superiority irritates and alienates; while an attitude of ready and sustained sympathy permits the growth of a mutual comprehension which makes for mutual profit.

§ 11. But while admitting the fallibility of our one-sided judgments on our own and other races' moral positions, it will be necessary to assume that our Western ideals, though not above criticism, and always susceptible of development, stand higher in the main than those which are at present effective elsewhere (except possibly in Japan).

To the highest of these ideals it will be most convenient to refer always as "Christian" ideals, even though we recognise that they have frequently been upheld by teachers who would repudiate the name of Christian, in opposition to cruder views championed for the moment by those who claimed to speak for Christianity. For the peculiar strength of Christianity—the agnostic moralist would perhaps prefer to say, "of Western Civilisation"—lies in its ever-developing capacity of assimilating ideas that it once combated, and thus growing in richness of content from era to era; so that whatever at any moment is seen to be highest and truest becomes *ipso facto* an integral part of Christian thought, and whatever the con-

science of the leaders of Western thought decides to condemn ceases *ipso facto* to have a claim to be included in any system of Christian ethics.

The religions which Christianity would replace are not in the same way developing religions. Irregular modification they indeed admit of, and perhaps some measure of true growth. But none, save Christianity, is so happily allied with the foremost scientific principles of the time as to be able to welcome, and advance with, the advance of scientific knowledge. It is to this very readiness to adapt itself that Christianity owes the confusing multiplicity of the shapes it has assumed. It is to this also that it owes its continuing strength. It is the religion of the world's future because it refuses to be formulated in a single set of documents, because it claims as its own at every step whatever it realises to be the highest in ethics, because it is ever looking forward, admitting that now it sees but in part, and that the perfect light is still to come.

Looking at the task of the Christian propagandist in this light, the critic of missionary work will refrain from grotesque attempts to estimate its success by exclusively statistical means—attempts such as have been made by Canon Taylor, who even goes so far as to declare that the fewness of the conversions means that the money of Sunday-school children

is obtained "on false pretences."[1] The whole tenor of his argument (which may be taken as typical) would seem to imply that we have here and now in England a perfected form of religion, the holders of which stand marked off by clear-cut boundary lines from the heathen world outside the pale. Against such a position it is hard to argue. One can only set in opposition to it the assumption, common to modern theology, philosophy, and science, that "we are but ancients of the earth, and in the morning of the times." A Christianity that humbly accepts this evolutionary view of its position and functions, that believes it has much further to travel before it attains its perfect stature than it has traversed in all the centuries of the past, will welcome with equal satisfaction the smallest upward stride of the most debased as of the most advanced of humankind. Only a fractional percentage of the sum total of upward steps taken by all the dwellers upon earth can come within the range of a statistical estimate such as Canon Taylor wishes to frame. Does the missionary therefore fail if he merely performs the preliminary task of raising, by a single grade, the great-grandfathers of the first recognisable Christians of a darkened continent?

[1] "The Great Missionary Failure" (*Fortnightly Review*, October, 1888).

§ 12. One of the points at which the practical ethics of East and West clash most strangely is the question of the complexity of the individual life. The Oriental honours above all things the renunciations of the ascetic; so much so, that many critics assert that unless its advocates are prepared to adopt ascetic ideals Christianity can hope to make but little progress in Hindustan.[1] The Western moralist may be ready to admit that a man must lose himself to find himself; but he cannot go yet further and say, with the Buddhist, that it is well to lose one's self in complete negation of self, desiring not to find one's self again, but utterly to cease from independent being. The only negation of egoism which the Christian can find it in his heart to praise is that which takes the form of altruism. He is ready to honour the renunciation that results from the desire to serve others, but can see no value in self-negating courses adopted without regard to social good. It is not a purposeless emptying of self, but rather the fostering of a "full" life—not egoistic self-suppression but rather strenuous self-development—that wins from him the tribute of admiration.[2]

[1] See e.g., the quotation from Dr. Oldfield, *infra*, p. 54.

[2] The contrast is well put by Bishop Whitehead, of Madras. "Christianity regards the personality of man as of the essence of his nature, and teaches that the highest destiny of man is the perfect development of his personality in its true relation to the

Thus to the practical European mind it is natural to see the first beginnings of a backward race's progress in the development of new economic wants, necessitating for their satisfaction the development of the more fundamental prudential virtues. In lands (such as certain parts of Central Africa) where industry is scarcely known and quite unhonoured, the first signs of a higher view of life will be connected, by the European, with the beginnings of a consistent industriousness; while among peoples of another type, for whom, though patient industry is an established virtue, universal marriage also is the rule of life, a sense of the duty of self-restraint with regard to the growth of the numbers of the population

infinite personality of God. But the Indian view of man makes his personality a kind of disease, the ultimate source of all his misery and weakness, so that the highest aim of human life is to get rid of personality altogether, and be lost in the impersonal being of the Infinite. It is obvious that these fundamentally different views of God and man affect profoundly the whole scale of moral and religious ideas. The ideas of sin, moral responsibility and salvation, which are natural to a Christian, are entirely unnatural to a Hindu philosopher" (*The East and the West*, January, 1905). Cf., in the same number, the following (by the Bishop of Birmingham). "Now our whole English civilisation, our whole idea of the reality of the world and the rationality of the universe, our whole conception of progress, is rooted in the thought that personality, the efforts of individuality, the desire and the will to live, is a good and not a bad thing. Hindu civilisation is rooted on an exactly contrary idea—the conception that the world and all its visible phenomena and all human life is one great illusion which has to be got rid of at all cost, and behind which there is the one impersonal reality."

needs to be first implanted. In these prudential virtues—industry, self-restraint, and their like—the practical sense of Europe rightly sees the indispensable bases for the building up of a purposeful orderly life.

But our pulpit-preachers, our poets, and our philosophic moralists, bent on correcting an excessive racial bias in this particular direction, have found it necessary at home to reiterate the complementary teaching, warning us that the needless multiplication of our wants leads to the gravest of evils, encouraging a demoralising competitive struggle for the means of luxury and social distinction. "Take no thought for the morrow," we are told; "consider the lilies of the field." Yet the preacher would quickly change his text if he found himself confronted by the squalor of an African village, where love of ease prevents proper precautions being taken for the harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or for the promotion of a life of decency and health.

What then are we to believe, and what to teach? Where can we draw the line? Are we to uphold one ideal for ourselves and another for "the heathen"? Assuredly no. Have we not rather here an instance of that necessity of reformulating our ideals, to which attention has already been drawn? As long as our moralists desired to

correct a faulty bias in Western character they laid all the stress of their teaching on one aspect only, so that that aspect came to be identified with the Christian ideal, and was taken for the whole truth. Brought into contact with the indolent African or the improvident Hindu, our missionaries must learn to emphasise another aspect, or their teaching, losing the necessary ring of sincerity, will fail to carry conviction.

The difficulty in this particular case lies in the impossibility of generalising as to when the idleness or the ambitious activity is likely to be more anti-social in its tendency. A higher life, Aristotle's *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην*, can only be built up on the basis of a preliminary training in the elementary virtues of industry and subordination: Aristotle would even make it dependent on the continued existence of a servile population; and there is at least a plausible case to be made out for the educative value of slavery. Mr. Booker Washington, himself an ex-slave, writes: "American slavery was a great curse to both races, and I would be the last to apologise for it; but, in the presence of God, I believe that slavery laid the foundation for the solution of the problem that is now before us in the South. During slavery the Negro was taught every trade, every industry, that constitutes the foundation for making a living" (*The Future of the American*

Negro, p. 221). Mr. Bryce also remarks that "in point of natural capacity and force of character the Bantu races are at least equal, probably superior, to the negroes brought from Africa to North America, most of whom seem to have come from the Guinea Coast. But in point of education and in habits of industry the American negroes are far ahead of the South African,"[1] and he sees the cause of this difference partly in the compulsory training received during the slave era (though also, of course, in the opportunities of advancement that have succeeded the civil war).

But not only is an industrial training the best of trainings in itself, as increasing the sense of power and consequently the self-respect of the native; the discovery also of what can be done with his earnings (though of course frequently a disastrous discovery) is itself a stimulus to development. "The receipt of high wages is an education altogether practical and open to none of the objections freely brought against that given in the mission school. Such wages mean new wants, at first no doubt more wives, more cows, gaudy apparel, revolvers, and greater consumption of 'Cape smoke,' but gradually the acquisition of the best things of civilisation, a drawing together as to tastes and habits of the white and

[1] *Impressions of South Africa*, p. 458.

coloured races."[1] New wants thus create new activities, and the new activities stimulate yet further wants, and thus the savage is allured step by step, almost without himself perceiving it, from his pristine state of slothful indifference.

The Christian missions in South and Central Africa are therefore probably acting wisely in laying stress on the industrial side of their work, in erecting technical schools for giving as extensive a training in agriculture and the minor manufacturing arts as is possible, and in encouraging their converts to acquire such practical knowledge as their teachers can provide. "I hold," says a missionary bishop, "that, in the natural order of things, necessity comes before choice; 'must' comes before 'ought,' and work for a living before work for a liking. And as I hold that some sort of work is the heritage of all, from the king to the cottager, from the palace to the kraal, since life means movement with a purpose, it follows that, if we are to do our duty to the native races of the countries Providence has given us, they must be taught the necessity of work with body and brains. . . . The problem before us, therefore, is to create such conditions and such wants as shall induce a natural (not a fictitious or tyrannical) necessity—such a necessity,

[1] Mr. J. Macdonnell, "The Natives of South Africa" (*Nineteenth Century*, February, 1901).

in fact, as shall practically force every able-bodied lad and man in the country to earn his own living and the living of his family."[1]

§ 13. But in the respect which we pay to the prudential virtues we must beware of falling into the complementary error of exalting them to too high a place. The agitation among certain sections of the colonists for black labour to be made compulsory (whether by the imposition of unnecessary taxation or otherwise) is, to say the least, of questionable merits. Man's sole business is not the production of material things, and the white man who devotes his whole energies to the amassing of wealth can scarcely be accounted a nobler being than the savage, whose desire is for the least effort and the utmost leisure; while he must certainly be classed as lower in the moral scale than most of the saddhus of India.

Such an over-emphasising of typical Western virtues is more likely to be a fault of Western politicians than of Christian missionaries. For the propagandist himself is little likely to be a typical representative of Western thought and practice, and he will probably have had a preliminary training in the Christian ministry, and be more inclined to denounce the contemptible side of Western life than to do justice to its nobler qualities. *His* temptation will rather be

[1] Bishop Gaul, quoted by Davis, *The Native Problem*, p. 54.

to under-emphasise what in his heart he must recognise to be after all essential, and to misrepresent and emasculate our ethics in the hope of attracting the mystical asceticism of India or the fantastic emotionalism of the Negro, in order to assure the superficial success of his propagandist activities.

As evidence of the reality of this danger it will be sufficient to quote the advice of a recent critic (Dr. Oldfield, in the *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1903), who, speaking of the contempt for English missionaries which he believes to be felt in educated Indian circles, asserts that "it would be better to send a dozen spiritual men, who would, living at one place, emulate the saintly lives and ascetic practices of the early fathers of the Christian Church . . . rather than to send men in scattered units, under all sorts of various administrations, to degenerate into elementary schoolmasters and managers of outcast children's homes and orphanages." In other words, Dr. Oldfield believes that we should send to the East men who would uphold not the ideals of our own time and race but the ideals of medieval Europe, which, themselves of Oriental growth, have since been definitively rejected by the Protestant North. A nominal adherence to an inferior form of Christianity we could no doubt further by such a method of proselytism, but who would be willing

to make sacrifices in such a cause? If we believe in the positive virtues which we praise at home, it is rank hypocrisy and folly to glorify the negative qualities which the East already adores, and to declare such to be of the essence of Christianity, and the best which Europe can offer to Asia. Doubtless a genuine sympathy with the passive ideals of Buddhism, and a reasonable respect for the earnestness of the ascetic, are desirable features in a missionary's character. But to "emulate" the "ascetic practices" of Oriental religions is to identify ourselves with a belief in the inherently evil nature of "the world" and "the flesh" that is one of the degrading heritages of the Asiatic influences from which philosophic Christianity is earnestly striving to shake itself free.

§ 14. It is in relation to ethical points such as these that the undecided character of Western teaching shows its most marked defects. But in the sphere of religion proper the wide divergence between the most advanced thought—the thought that recognises in Christianity an evolving system of truth—and the commoner view, which sees in some contemporary statement of dogma a position of unassailable strength, is also fruitful of evil for the work of the mission field. It is seldom that those who take the humbler view of Christian fallibility are as ready to fling themselves away in

the service of non-Christian humanity as are the dogmatists, and this not so much through any lack of moral earnestness as from a difficulty in seeing clearly what sort of message they are to carry to the dark places of the earth, and how they are to make intelligible to the more backward minds what the great mass of their fellow-Europeans have failed to grasp. Thus an American bishop, speaking of the type of man required for service in India, gives his opinion thus: "The Christian Church of America cannot afford to export doubts or even religious speculation to foreign fields. The people of India, and I may add of other lands, are abundantly able to provide all the doubts and all the unprofitable speculation that any Church will care to contend with."[1]

Of course the inner significance of this remark will depend upon the full meaning attached to the phrase "religious speculation." And it must be admitted that few missionaries are likely to be able to hold consistently to the modern view of Christianity without presenting an appearance of unprofitable weakness (though readers of Dr. Hume's *Missions from the Modern View* will realise that there is a place for such missionaries, and that such missionaries are to be found). On

[1] Bishop Thoburn (quoted in Mr. J. P. Jones' *India's Problem, Krishna or Christ*, p. 209).

the other hand, the very positiveness of the dogmatic preacher, while rendering him, perhaps, more effective among certain strata of the population, deprives him of all influence among the cultured and partly cultured classes of a country like India. He is no match for the subtle-brained dialectician who is trained in the habit of following out metaphysical speculations such as few Europeans care to unravel, and who is likely to be aware, unless his reading in Western literature and his acquaintance with educated Englishmen are very confined, that there is scarcely a dogma of Christianity which is not hotly combated in Europe by Christian as well as by agnostic writers.

Until, therefore, the central truths of Christian philosophy can be so formulated as to present a clear-cut body of doctrine such as the ablest of our earnest-minded thinkers can accept and clear-headed men can be found willing to devote themselves to propagating abroad, the nominal, superficial progress of Christianity in countries like India is likely to remain disappointingly slight. But even while we continue to work on our present haphazard and defective system, there can be little question of its real success in ways less easily measured. By the elevating influence of its partially understood ideals there is little doubt that Christian teaching, even though ostensibly rejected, has done more to evoke a higher

morality in India than all preceding waves of religious propagandism. Among other evidences we may point to the Unitarian teaching connected with the name of the Brahma Samáj—a force in modern India making distinctly for righteousness, and unmistakably a product of the clash of Christianity and Hinduism. A member of this society in a public lecture[1] has said that "the spirit of Christianity has already pervaded the whole atmosphere of Indian society, and we breathe, think, feel, and move in a Christian atmosphere. Native society is being roused, enlightened, and reformed under the influence of Christian education. If it is true that the future of a nation is determined by all the circumstances and agencies which to-day influence its nascent growth, surely the future Church of this country will be the result of the leading creeds of the day—harmonised, developed, and shaped under the influence of Christianity."

The appearance of societies such as this[2] may

[1] Quoted by Sir G. B. Frere, *Indian Missions*, p. 46.

[2] Of a similar sect, the Arya Somaj, which has sprung up in the Punjab, Mr. J. Kennedy states that "it is at once a protest against Christian teaching and Western scholarship. And yet the Arya Somaj has imbibed much of both. It adopts Western science, and it slavishly copies Christian institutions. It has its schools and colleges, its missionaries and boards. . . . It advocates (and practises) the education of women. It contemplates the reduction of all castes to four, and the rise from one caste to another by merit. Idolatry is utterly rejected, and the monotheism of the Arya Somaj is sharply defined" (*The East and the West*, Vol. III, p. 164).

seem to some enthusiastic propagandists an unsatisfactory and disheartening result. It is not what was aimed at. But is it not for that very reason a powerful witness to the fruitfulness and vitality of the principles which the missionary upholds?

§ 15. The religion of modern Europe differs from the religions of Asia and Africa in being a developing religion with ideals admittedly incomplete. The moral background to life in modern Christendom differs from that of Asia and Africa in that the individual soul is the moral unit and not the caste or clan, the two complementary principles of cosmopolitanism and individualism being combined in the characteristic Christian dicta, that a man must be prepared to leave wife and children for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake, and must be ready to see his children and brethren in those that do the will of the Heavenly Father. The modern Christian view of life differs moreover from that of the two more backward continents in the honour it pays to the prudential virtues, and in the high place it accords to the complex nature of man, whose physical, intellectual, and moral development it accounts alike worthy of attention.

For the sake of a larger measure of the success that can be set forth in statistical tables we shall not follow the advice of those who agree with

Dr. Oldfield, by sacrificing or concealing any one of these ethical divergencies. But ought we, it may reasonably be asked, deliberately to set about implanting our Western virtues in Asiatic and African communities, seeking to substitute, with indiscriminate zeal, our own good qualities for theirs?

The question is not easy to answer. In the case of the relative value of the different moral units—the caste or clan, and the individual soul—the wisest answer would seem to be that we have not yet analysed the moral problems involved with such thoroughness as to feel justified in endeavouring to revolutionise existing Oriental forms of social life. Until we know more than we know at present we dare not act, except with experimental tentativeness, lest we blunder in this as we have blundered in the past over such matters as Indian land-tenure.

But with regard to the other points of divergence, we can hardly do wrong in upholding, as uncompromisingly as may be, but without intolerance or insolent vehemence of dogmatising, our own conception of what ennobles and illumines life. We are responsible for a conscientious "witnessing" to our reasoned views of truth. We are not responsible for their acceptance by others. And so it is that a certain self-restraint in moral propagandism is desirable and, indeed, necessary in our work.

The propagandist spirit is closely allied to a spirit of self-assertiveness which is by no means wholly good. Those who compass heaven and earth to make a single proselyte are seldom of the salt of the earth themselves. Their zeal is largely due to an unconscious desire to minister to their own pride and self-gratification. This their hearers are seldom slow to feel, and generally ready to resent; and so the wiser teachers, being more concerned for the progress of the truth for the truth's sake than for their own self-satisfaction in the use of a convincing dialectic, content themselves largely with silent arguments. Indeed, a little experience usually brings home even to the less sagacious that a theory formulated seldom and without heat, but systematically acted on with quiet, unwavering consistency, wins in the long run more converts than one pressed in season and out of season with the foolish zeal of the partisan. Not only, therefore, should the Christian in non-Christian lands abide steadfastly by his own view of the truth in the face of unrelaxing opposition, and be ready, in the spirit of humility and patience, to weigh, in a receptive manner, with a view to the possible modification of his own theories, the conflicting theories of others; but he must be prepared at all times to accept—tolerant in spite of his inability to comprehend—the fact that other ideals appeal to other people,

whom he cannot compel to accept his view of life any more than he can bring himself to accept theirs.

§ 16. The work of Christianising the world appears (in the eyes of the enthusiasts) to be progressing with disappointing slowness, especially when the vast machinery of modern Christendom is compared with the feeble resources of the evangelists of the first century. For this, however, reasons may be found not entirely discreditable to the zeal of contemporary Christianity.

When missionary enterprise endeavours to spread what it conceives to be distinctively Christian doctrine, it finds itself not a little hampered by the immensity of the gulf between the missionary mind and the untaught native mind. Its comparative freedom from superstitious and crudely attractive elements is, for proselytising purposes, not the least of the drawbacks which prevent a rapid superficial success. Primitive Christianity was not thus hampered; for St. Paul accepted in the main the philosophical position of the mass of his contemporaries, including such current Jewish notions as the ubiquity of spiritual "principalities" and "powers." But now, when the missionary finds himself hindered in his work by a belief in witchcraft (say) held by the native elders of his congregation, his impulse is to combat it without mercy, even to the point of

excommunicating the offenders for their belief, forgetful of the fact that belief in witchcraft was current in Christian Europe a very few years back, if it was not actually to be counted an integral part of the Christian creed.

The gulf which separates fetichism and similar primitive estimates of man's place in the universe from the most fully developed Western views of the relations of God and man is too vast to be covered in a single leap. A general intellectual training must go hand-in-hand with moral and religious training. The missionary cannot, of course, supply one without incidentally doing something towards supplying the other, but he must settle to his own satisfaction on which form of work he intends to lay the greater emphasis—whether to devote his chief strength to the imparting of dogma in a form acceptable to lower-grade minds, along with such moral training as he can combine with it, or to give his main efforts to building up the intellectual capabilities of his disciples.

This however must not be taken to imply a belief that the chief significance of the missionary's work lies in the imparting of a systematic training of either kind. Rather it is the presence of the human being embodying in some measure the higher ideal that is all-important. The uniqueness of Christianity among the religions of the world is due largely to its being the embodiment of a life, and

not merely a philosophy of life. This is the keystone of its strength even in the most intellectually advanced circles. But it requires some mental power to visualise a living personality from historical data merely. The untrained native of the tropics has seldom this capacity. The missionary's life should aid him in filling in the vague outlines of the Ideal Life. But none the less the missionary must choose (or his Society for him) to which of several possible occupations he will ostensibly devote himself; for his character cannot disclose itself *in vacuo*.

Moreover, the part of moral training which can most easily be reduced to definite formulæ, and thus taught, is the negative side. It is easier to prohibit special activities than to raise the whole tone of activity by the presentation of a higher ideal. But if Christianity is to come as a living force it must come as a positive force, exalting and ennobling the possibilities of life. The presence of the missionary, living, as nearly as may be, the life that he would live in a Christian environment —or better still, if possible, the sight of a group of Christian laymen living lives of purposeful activity —is likely to be of more avail than the fullest course of systematic instruction in Christian ethics.

Of the African Negro, Sir H. H. Johnston writes as follows (*The Colonisation of Africa*, pp. 146-7): "The Negro (unless he be Muham-

madanised) is easily converted, and as easily relapses into gross superstition or a negation of all religion, including his former simple but sound ideas of right and wrong. That Christianity may become permanently rooted in a Negro race it is necessary that it be maintained by a higher power for a long period as the religion of the State. The Negro kingdoms which have retained their independence have usually lost their Christianity in a recognisable form. It is not so with Muhammadanism, the explanation being that Muhammadanism as taught to the Negro demands no sacrifice of his bodily lusts, whereas Christianity with its restrictions ends by boring him, unless and until his general mental condition, by individual genius or generations of transmitted culture, reaches the level of the European. As instances of the former, one might mention some ten or a dozen individuals, living at the present time, who are priests and deacons of Christianity in Africa, while for examples of permanently rooted Christianity as the result of inheritance, it is only necessary to point to the thousands of really good Negro men and women to be found in the United States and the British West Indies."

This description of the African's attitude towards Christianity, if truly drawn—and it reads as if it might well be true—would seem to point to a

faulty bias in missionary teaching, in the direction of making of Christianity mainly a code of moral prohibitions. If such a bias exists—it is not easy for a writer at a distance to pronounce judgment on the point—it is a bias that needs correction. It is not by adding to the list of forbidden activities that Christianity will win the allegiance of backward races. Christianity came that men might have life, and have it more abundantly; and however necessary prohibitions and negative teaching may prove to be, they can, no more than the mere extension of a ceremonial code dealing with the keeping of Sabbaths and the performance of ecclesiastical functions, be accounted the central parts of a system of Christian teaching.

Of this, no doubt, most, if not all, missionaries will be fully convinced. The difficulty lies in finding for the higher ideal of missionary work the opportunity of practical expression. The missionary's character cannot disclose itself *in vacuo*, and the social ideals of civilised man cannot be exemplified by a white man living in isolation among uncleanly barbarians. Both for the sake of giving the scattered whites the opportunity of shadowing forth the civilised man's customary manner of life, and for the sake of fostering the nascent civilisation of the pupil race, there is needed the gradual formation of a new social and political environment.

CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES IN RELATION TO THE TASK OF REFORMATION

§ 17. FOR the purpose of encouraging the growth of that fuller and more abundant life, of which the Christian missionary is the herald and forerunner, there is need for the expenditure of thoughtful effort, controlled by the highest form of sympathetic and imaginative insight, in the calling into existence of visible, tangible institutions to which the nascent civilisation may attach itself as it develops.[1]

This may at first sight appear but a matter of secondary importance—perhaps even a regrettable cause of distraction from better modes of service. Many earnest minds, genuinely interested in the progress of foreign missions, deprecate the diversion of missionary energy from the more spiritual work of personal influence over individuals to the

[1] It is, in another shape, the question of the best means of promoting in the right direction the progressive modification of the human environment, which has been already mentioned in section 5.

fostering of ecclesiastical, educational, and industrial institutions. No doubt much harm may result, in some cases has resulted, from undue devotion to these and similar achievements, the concrete character of which enables them to serve as tangible evidence of progress, for the satisfaction of the missionary himself in his hours of despondency, or of the community from which he expects material support. Spiritual results cannot be tabulated or quoted with convincing positiveness; while statements as to buildings, and statistics of meetings and membership, lend themselves easily to such purposes. This many feel, and perhaps rightly, to be a danger. The missionary is tempted to leave his proper task and become an organiser of schools and workshops.

Yet, though this be granted, there is much to be said on the other side. The mere existence of numerous institutions which may serve as centres for new expansive movements, the mere fact of a whole population (as in Uganda or Madagascar) being superficially Christianised, the mere spread of elementary knowledge of European industries —all these have a distinct and permanent value which we need not attempt to weigh critically in the balances against the deeper ethical progress made by individuals. Institutionalism may be an evil, but the absence of abiding institutions is an element of weakness likewise. Indeed, the most

hopeful lines of civilising activity — the moral training of the young, and the spread of an ennobling literature—depend almost entirely for their success upon steady concerted effort. Sporadic undertakings can achieve but little.

There is a supreme need, therefore, of building up in backward countries a suitable environment, intellectual and moral, for the growing mind. Without this, even the picked spirits can progress but feebly, and in a maimed, uncertain fashion. The lecturer in an Indian University feels his helplessness for dealing effectively with students who come from homes in which there are no books, who have no extensive vernacular literature of a high order to which they can turn for recreative study, who have few companions with whom they can discuss serious questions intimately. The creation of an inspiring environment is a hard task, and necessarily a slow task — a work for centuries rather than for generations. Japan's rapid rise may seem to refute this dictum. But in Japan there appears always to have been an atmosphere of profound ethical thought, and a deep culture which, though alien to ours, enabled disciplined minds, co-operating with the enthusiasm of a spontaneous loyalty, to effect great results with unexampled rapidity. The rise of Japan, except in so far as international power is concerned, has been no rise at all, but rather a slight change of front, and

an assertion of claims which previously she had been content not to make. In India, though perhaps no other country has known a grander succession of reforming prophets and Protestant teachers, the occasional waves of ethical propagandism that have swept over whole kingdoms with what might have seemed irresistible force, have, prior to our own day, owing to the absence of permanent instruments of popular instruction, such as the abiding church system of Europe, spent their force and passed, leaving little, in the shape of any steady cultivation of moral thought, to mark their passage.

The environment that will favour steady growth needs the support of a framework of definite institutions, which will form as it were the supporting skeleton for the living organism of a progressive civilisation. Spiritual forces, however high, require the aid of material instruments. And these instruments, in the shape of press and pulpit, schools and laws, police and roads, to strengthen and encourage developing aspirations and to retard any temporary retrogression, it is the happy privilege of the strong peoples to bestow for the benefit of the weak. By themselves, uninformed by the aspiring spirit which is the spirit of Christianity, they may be of but little value. But as the means by which that spirit may be enabled to work, there are no words too strong

to express their pre-eminent and indispensable importance.

§ 18. From the consideration of this question of the building up of helpful institutions, we turn to ask what should be our attitude towards existing institutions, the influence of which is either positively harmful or at least a hindrance to moral progress.

Let us take as instances the obligation of universal child-marriage, and the restraints of the caste-system in India. These two, in the rapidly changing industrial environment of the modern world, tend to produce an atmosphere of stagnation, a helpless submission to seemingly inevitable suffering, which reacts on ethical and religious beliefs. For the uncontrolled growth of population, due to the former, and the hindrances to the free flow of labour from the decaying to the rising industries, due to the latter, combine to prevent the adjustment of labour-supply to the varying opportunities of a violently fluctuating market. In the past they have hindered and hampered all true progress. Progress has become, to the Indian mind, almost unthinkable. What has been always will be. It is fate; it is the will of the gods; it is anything, in short, but a result of national folly, for the perpetuation of which each generation is in its day responsible.

Pessimism such as this (though itself but the

consequence of maladjustments in the material conditions of life) prevents the formation of helpful ethical ideas—a point too often overlooked. For we cannot conceive the Good apart from progress; as early Christianity recognised when it placed optimism among the supreme duties of life—bracketing Hope with Faith and Love.

Yet such institutions, evil as their more conspicuous effects may be, are often too closely bound up with the whole framework of society for a hasty frontal attack upon them to be likely to succeed, or if successful to be likely to be beneficial. The good in them may not be easy to discover, yet it is obvious that no people could through generation after generation tolerate social practices that were evil without qualification.[1] Child-marriage counteracts other, though perhaps not greater, mischiefs. The caste-system, wielding the dread sanctions of excommunication and outlawry, though it does little to foster a healthy moral sentiment, undoubtedly acts as a check on utter lawlessness. "Their civilisation," writes an ex-

[1] A similar statement may also be made with regard to many religious beliefs, which at first hearing seem only fantastic combinations of misguided folly. However grotesque they may be, they are bound to have a submerged basis of common sense, or they could never have become widely accepted. That part of the belief which is put into words, and evokes our ridicule or abhorrence, is often but an extraneous detail. The efficient part lies lower down. A more patient analysis of the creed may show our ridicule to have missed its mark.

perienced missionary, "though different from ours, has a consistency as a whole; and we cannot easily eliminate certain parts and substitute for them those of our own civilisation without dislocating the whole. Therefore it is often safer and better to conserve what seems to us the lesser good of their civilisation than to introduce what seems the greater good of our own."[1]

A premature assault on these strongholds of evil is likely to result in little more than the disabling of Christianity for the attainment of other aims. The conservative forces that play their part all over the world, and are in most cases substantially healthy in their general tone, will continue to resist vigorously the seemingly anarchical efforts of the reformer; even as those subjects of the Roman Empire whose sense of civic duties was strongest, condemned the Christianity of early centuries (perhaps not altogether unjustly) for its refusal to share adequately in the social and political aims of the time. Destruction, even of the worst institutions, is nearly always accompanied by incidental evils, and these it should be our aim to minimise. Evolution rather than revolution should be the watchword of Christianity, as indeed it already is among the more broad-minded of Christian missionaries. We must be content to let Christian thought

[1] Mr. J. P. Jones, *India's Problem: Krishna or Christ*, p. 225.

gradually permeate the non-Christian world, in such wise that the latter may develop without any jarring and demoralising break with its past. For continuity, equally with the introduction and propagation of new ideals, is essential to national development. There is need of a firm holding on to the good of the past, as well as a bold breaking away towards the good of the future.

Making development rather than substitution the main element in our civilising work, we shall abstain scrupulously from all needless destruction of social institutions. Some will have to be swept away; by force, if need be. But these will not be numerous, and we shall find that their number diminishes as we subject them all to careful scrutiny. Meanwhile, we should be setting up the institutional framework round which the nascent civilisation is to form itself. But in attempting this we shall do well to refrain from bringing it ostentatiously into conflict with the institutions we desire to supplant; except where the mass of the people are themselves eager (as the Negroes seem eager)[1] to shake themselves

[1] This is admitted even by hostile writers. Mr. Roderick Jones in an article on "The Black Peril in South Africa" (*Nineteenth Century*, May, 1904), declares that "the natives are awakening from the slumber of centuries, and there is no more remarkable feature of this awakening than their almost insatiable thirst for knowledge. Cape Colony and the territories are literally peppered with native schools, the territories alone having several hundreds."

free from the evil heritage of their ancestral traditions.

Yet however cautiously we proceed there will remain social institutions whose influence is such that they must be deliberately undermined and ultimately attacked openly. Already by the crushing out of the slave-trade and the suppression of such evils as widow-burning we have taken a few steps in the desired direction. But our policy has not been sufficiently constant or sufficiently disinterested for us to achieve enough to deserve any large measure of applause or gratitude. We have destroyed some few evil institutions, but it has been by erratic, sporadic effort, and we have seldom taken sufficient care to replace them by institutions of a healthy kind likely to aid the lower races' advance.

The failure to do so is natural, as it is not easy so to analyse the complex conditions of our own and others' manner of life as to be able to identify with certitude the main forces that make therein for good or for evil. The pupil, moreover, whether man or nation, tends to copy what is on the surface (the English system of Parliamentary government, say) without studying its presuppositions (which in this particular case must include a long-continued training in the tasks of local administration and responsibility in matters of justice and finance).

Thus it is that our ecclesiastical and educational systems when transplanted to other continents remain largely exotics, with a touch of the grotesque in their appearance even where most flourishing. Is not this because we have been too eager for brilliant results, too prone to spend our energies in building at the top before a proper foundation has been laid, too bent on dealing first with "higher" matters rather than with the formation of simple industrial organisations fostering a regular life of sober activity, and schools giving a training in the more elementary requirements of citizenship? We need to begin lower down, and spend more thought on the fundamentals of civilised life.

§ 19. But whether we devote our energies to the destroying of the institutions that make for evil, or to the building up of those that make for good, we must beware of sparing too much of our attention to the immediate results of our work, or to its visible effects in the promotion of happiness. Transitional periods are almost always ugly and often pitifully grotesque. The shortcomings of the partially trained Negro or Hindu, his misestimation of his own importance, his loss of some attractive qualities and his inadequate comprehension of the virtues which should take their place, exasperate the colonial or Anglo-Indian, who has not patience to wait for the

long-deferred harvest which his children's children may reap.

Many who start as enthusiasts in the cause of the down-trodden peoples are tempted to abandon their efforts in disgust, at the first signs of incongruity in the native's attempts to adopt European ideals. Most of those Europeans who make their livelihood in our Asiatic or African dependencies are inconvenienced by the spread of a superficial "education," which renders previously obsequious Hindus or Kafirs discontented or insolent. Accordingly they are always ready to turn any incongruities of half-development to account, ridiculing every attempt of the subject races to raise themselves by clumsily imitative methods, and finding much food for merriment in the vagaries of Indian "Congresses," or of the Ethiopian Church.

When, however, the whole question is looked at in the abstract and from a distance, one cannot but realise the necessity of such absurdities appearing. We have to carry upward from a state of undisciplined childhood, peoples whose only morality was blind obedience to caste or tribal regulations, and who, perhaps, knew nothing of regular industry. We must train these folk, simultaneously, in the elements of civilised life—in the habit of obeying moral laws unsanctioned by caste or custom, in habits of social co-operation and of

systematic labour at agriculture, or in other industries—endeavouring at the same time to impress upon them ecclesiastical dogma (perhaps) and what must seem to them an uncouth church ceremonial; and finally seeking to instil into them a sense of duty as regards such minor matters of citizenship as service on local boards and juries, and the giving of evidence in courts of law. In what order is such an all-embracing series of changes to be brought about? Can, indeed, any one of the proposed steps in advance be taken until most of the others are taken? There is no inevitable sequence of grades through which the advance is to be made, as one goes from Euclid's first proposition to the forty-seventh. Rather, each single step is reciprocally necessary to each of the others.[1] As soon as a step is taken in one direction its inadequacy by itself is at once perceived. A hundred other lines of progress must be attempted simultaneously. Meanwhile, how can the pupil fail to appear grotesque? An oratorical Bengalee, declaiming against British tyranny, but

[1] The tendency (noted by many writers) of the African Negro to degenerate, when not subjected to the continued influence of contact with higher races, may be due to the unequal stimulus given by civilisation to certain of his faculties as compared with others; the reactionary pull of the undeveloped faculties (which have evolved in such wise as to be best adapted to a non-civilised environment and exert a strong bias in favour of returning to it) proves too strong a factor in his life when not counterbalanced by external forces.

unwilling to do his part in bringing about some municipal reform ; an emancipated Negro in a top hat, capable of playing the piano but incapable of earning his own living—such figures lend themselves readily to caricature, and make the reformer's enthusiasm seem fanatically misguided.

The temperate advocate of reform, however, will accept such manifestations as but the natural outcome of the conditions. His is not the hasty creed of early nineteenth-century liberalism, which imagined that the training of a couple of generations might place the Negro on a par, morally and intellectually, with the foremost nations of the day ; but a reasonable belief in the *potential* equality of all mankind (as sharing alike in a capacity for unlimited development), — a radically different conception, which only misinterpretation can render ridiculous in the eyes of unprejudiced thinkers.

But apart from these ungenerous critics, there are others of a more sympathetic character who yet deprecate unflagging effort for the uplifting of the dependent races, arguing that it is little likely to increase the sum-total of the happiness of humankind. And if, through lack of faith in the ultimate rightness of the laws of the moral universe, we allow ourselves to be guided solely by utilitarian criteria of this sort, we can hardly do other than come to the same conclusion. For the pro-

motion of human happiness is a gain too remote and too problematical ever to be a convincing motive where faith is weak. If we are to advance at all it must be in another spirit than this.

Yet, as criticism directed against a certain kind of short-sighted enthusiasm, this pessimistic treatment of the matter is not without its value. For not seldom the sensitiveness of the cultured reformer prevents him from seeing things as they really are. In "putting himself in another's place" he goes at once too far and not far enough. He imagines that others suffer as he himself would suffer if he were compelled to live as they. When, however, he gets an opportunity of observing more closely the light-hearted lives of those to whom he has given his pity (whether in the East End of London or in the ports of China, it matters little) he is completely taken aback. Frequently, in the reaction, he loses all further interest in his philanthropic fancies. Rarely indeed would it be the case that the philanthropist of the study could catch his first glimpse of the poverty-stricken black races—perhaps a swarm of chattering men, women, and boys, dressed indistinguishably, discharging the coal of a tramp steamer at Port Said, smothered in dirt from head to foot, shrieking, laughing, sky-larking, like half-human children, chattering interminably, thoroughly contented with the life of the moment and utterly

neglectful of the morrow—and seeing such a sight feel no lessening of his sympathies at the shock of it. To raise them in the scale of humanity will hardly mean an immediate increase in their enjoyment of life. How could it?

§ 20. As in that other branch of philosophy which investigates the conditions which affect the well-being of nations, and claims for itself the title of "Political Economy" (more naturally applicable, one would think, to the discussion of such problems as ours), there is need for us to be perpetually on our guard to avoid confusing "long-period" and "short-period" results.

Some writers and thinkers are mainly concerned with the immediate future, and others with matters affecting the permanent welfare of humanity. But both may be doing work that is useful in their day and generation; and while the conclusions of the former may at times seem diametrically opposed to those of the latter, both may be true alike, but with different limitations, and suppressed "saving clauses" of a different character.

With the closet optimist we must agree that it is only as a consequence of the long-continued contact of higher and lower that the lower "in the long run" can be expected to achieve its salvation; and also that it is through the conscientious handling of the perplexing tasks of guiding and restraining the lower, that the higher may "in

the long run" best hope to widen its ethical experiences and rise yet higher again. But the statesman, while not forgetting what lies nearer the distant horizon, and taking care not to waste his strength by striking at incidental symptoms and inevitable transitional ills, must give a larger share of attention to the short-period problems; and these are by no means simple. For the mere contact of higher and lower brings its moral drawbacks as well as its moral gains. The higher may be stimulated by the new responsibilities; but often the more conspicuous results are of a regrettable character; for the status of superiority brings its temptations as well as its ennobling stimuli.

Both in the black belt of the United States and in South Africa the whites have largely lost the habit of performing manual labour, and acquired the habit of despising it.[1] Contempt for the inferior race combines with a natural physical aversion, and while the crimes of the lower against the higher necessitate legislation of a repressive character (passing easily into legislation which offends against elementary conceptions of justice), or even arouse a fiendish resentment which blazes out in the degrading practice of Lynch Law, the crimes of the higher against the persons of the lower come to seem no crimes, or at worst

[1] See e.g. Mr. Bryce's *Impressions of South Africa*, pp. 438 *seq.*

offences on a level with cruelty to animals. When a Clive can feel justified in stooping to Oriental methods of intrigue in dealing with Oriental intriguers, the rank and file of European conquerors and colonists feel little shame in going yet further. Thus the moral sense of the European is blunted—whether it be with the bestiality of Africa, or with the treachery of Asia that he comes into contact—and the possibility of the higher exerting any beneficent influence over the lower passes away.

The weakness of the lower races is at once a temptation and a source of irritation to their neighbours. "Even between civilized peoples, such as Germans and Russians, or Spaniards and Frenchmen, there is a disposition to be unduly annoyed by traits and habits which are not so much culpable in themselves as distasteful to men constructed on different lines. This sense of annoyance is naturally more intense towards a race so widely removed from the modern European as the Kafirs are. Whoever has travelled among people of a race greatly weaker than his own must have sometimes been conscious of an impatience or irritation which arises when the native fails to understand or neglects to obey the command given. The sense of his superior intelligence and energy of will produces in the European a sort of tyrannous spirit, which will not condescend to

argue with the native, but overbears him by sheer force, and is prone to resort to physical coercion. Even just men, who have the deepest theoretical respect for human rights, are apt to be carried away by the consciousness of superior strength, and to become despotic if not harsh" (Bryce, *Impressions of South Africa*, p. 442).

This tyrannous attitude is, indeed, most noticeable in the case of those whites who have little else on which to pride themselves except their colour. But few altogether escape it. It combines with that aversion for men of different colour, unreasoning, but not necessarily unreasonable, which is one of the most deep-seated instincts of human nature. Even some of the dark races (the Zulus for instance) are said to feel it for the European, while it is probably also one of the causes which originated and one of the buttresses which sustain the caste system of India. It is not of course to be hastily deplored as a wholly undesirable "failing." Without it the evolution of the higher stocks might conceivably have been less rapid. It is perhaps most strongly marked, moreover, among the more refined individuals of our own stock (the gentler spirits who endeavour to avoid all display of a feeling which they are inclined to believe unjust) than it is among those who in America or South Africa make a pose of their desire for "race purity," but in fact prefer black servants to white, and in times past did not

scruple to maintain the servile practice of concubinage. With these the governing impulse is rather a desire for domination over the weaker than a dislike of contact with them.[1]

A similar contrast may be noticed between the more and the less refined of European peoples. The South European intermarries with dark races much more freely than the Teuton. The Goanese, for instance, form quite a nation of Indo-Portuguese origin, while South and Central America are largely populated by people of mixed blood; but in the United States it is said now to be quite unusual for there to be even any illegitimate offspring of black and white parents.

If this feeling spread it might be thought possible that a more tolerant mutual attitude should follow; the white and dark living side by side, rendering mutual services, abstaining from unnecessary social competition, each feeling so morally remote from the other as to be under no temptation, the one to give expression to that scorn for the lower orders which rouses their natural hostility, or the other by partially success-

[1] Mr. J. A. Hobson in his article "The Negro Problem in the United States" (*Nineteenth Century*, October, 1903), speaks of it as a feeling "inherited from the time of slavery and hardly impaired by the process of two generations." There is not necessarily anything "inherited" in the feeling, however. It is strongly marked in the Anglo-Indian world, where it is not uncommon to meet persons in whom dread of native disrespect amounts almost to a disease.

ful emulation to excite the indignant bitterness of the inferior members of the higher orders. But the weight of thoughtful opinion seems to be opposed to the possibility of this as a permanent solution of the problem.[1]

Where, as in the Southern area of the United States, the white man considers it advisable to hold himself aloof from the life of the Negro, the latter has little opportunity of raising his aims in life. Therefore he remains, because untaught, apparently unteachable. The unconstitutional violence which prevents him from exercising his nominal rights as a citizen makes it impossible for him to recognise in the white man's ways a

[1] Cf. Mr. J. A. Hobson's "The Negro Problem in the United States" (*Nineteenth Century*, October, 1903). "This unique phenomenon is presented by a Southern city — two races of free citizens endowed by law with political and civil equality occupying the same soil, walking the same streets, but destitute of all personal sympathy with one another and of all genuine human contact. Such a civilisation has not in it the elements of stability." Cf. also Mr. H. G. Wells' admirable discussion of the "Tragedy of Colour" in his *The Future in America* (pp. 259–281). "Racial differences," he says, "seem to me to exasperate intercourse unless people have been elaborately trained to ignore them. Uneducated men are as bad as cattle in persecuting all that is different among themselves. The most miserable and disorderly countries of the world are the countries where two races, two inadequate cultures, keep a jarring continuous separation. . . . [Mr. Booker Washington] dreams of a coloured race of decent and inagressive men, silently giving the lie to all the legends of their degradation. They will have their own doctors, their own lawyers, their own capitalists, their own banks—because the whites desire it so. But will the whites endure even so submissive a vindication as that? . . ."

superior order of justice; while the fury of the mobs of lynchers degrades both the white man and the black. "Violence, when once it breaks out, is apt to spread, because the men of each race take sides in any tumult, and apt to be accompanied by cruelty, because pity is blunter towards those who stand outside the racial or social pale, and the passions of a racial conflict sweep all but the gentlest natures away. Every outrage on one side provokes an outrage on the other; and if a series of outrages occur, each race bands itself together for self-defence, awaiting attack, and probably provoking attack by the alarm its combination inspires."[1] Thus the vicious circle of treating an inferior as necessarily and hopelessly inferior keeps him continuously inferior. And the already difficult problem is rendered less and less easily soluble as a consequence of the rising barriers of hatred and envy that thrust the two races yet further apart.

§ 21. But worse, perhaps, in their ultimate consequences than envy and hatred between higher and lower, are the scorn of the former and the resultant self-contempt and despair of the latter. In the presence of the arrogant white, flaunting insultingly his superior powers, the despised blacks degenerate into baser beings than they would otherwise have become. "Dirt in his eyes,

[1] Mr. Bryce, *Romanes Lecture*, p. 30.

they soon become as dirt in their own."[1] And they become positively enfeebled by their consciousness of inferiority. "If we hear of a race like the Tasmanians or the Red Indians disappearing quietly, under no stress of persecution, no massacres or poisonings, we are perhaps inclined to look upon the process as a harmless and painless one. It is not so. Those men and women who look broken-down by the time they are thirty, who leave no children behind them, who have forgotten their fishing and their hunting and their old rude forms of art, who sit (as I have seen one or two) with heads bowed, doing nothing, saying nothing, in a world in which there is no longer anything they can call their own—those men and women are, I think, engaged in a process that we sometimes read about but do not often see: they are dying of despair."[2]

With the inborn aversion felt for the man of different physical appearance, and the hostile sentiments that are fostered by short-sighted statesmanship, is often combined a cruelly selfish determination to avoid all economic competition between members of the white and the coloured races. Mr. Bryce mentions the existence of a white man's prejudice which prevents the employment of Kafirs as drivers or stokers of locomotives,

[1] Mr. Gilbert Murray, *Liberalism and the Empire*, p. 148.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 149.

though they are admittedly capable of performing the work well. The childish action of the Australian legislature with regard to the mail contracts is fresh in everybody's mind. Mr. Booker Washington in his *The Future of the American Negro*, gives pathetic instances of the difficulties in the way of the black man's getting an industrial training, and his still greater difficulty—with white employees refusing to work alongside of him—of finding employment, and his frequent demoralisation in consequence of the disheartening handicaps of his career.

In so far as these obstacles thrust in the way of the dark peoples are due to a selfish spirit of self-protection against competition, argument against them is mostly futile. Nothing but the sternest action on the part of sovereign power is likely to be of any avail in checking such abuses, and even the strongest legislative authority must often fail of effecting its purpose until backed up by a vigorous local sentiment in favour of fair treatment. This is one of the weightiest reasons for withholding from the white men on the spot the full power of dealing as they choose with their weaker neighbours.[1] The local expert has no

[1] Cf. Mr. Kidd's *Control of the Tropics*, p. 57. "The one underlying principle of success in any future relationship to the tropics is to keep those who administer the government which represents our civilisation in direct and intimate contact with the standards of that civilisation at its best; and to keep the acts of the govern-

doubt much knowledge of the character, expectations and beliefs of the native, which the "sentimental" philanthropist in the home-land has not,[1] and the interference of the latter may thus cause much temporary mischief. But over against this evil we must set the alternative evil of allowing short-sighted people, rendered impatient by the irritation of continually dealing with their incom-

ment itself within the closest range of that influence, often irksome, sometimes even misleading, but always absolutely vital,—the continual scrutiny of the public mind at home." Cf. also Mr. Gilbert Murray's *Liberalism and the Empire*, p. 156 *seq.*

[1] It should be added, however, that the local resident seldom takes the trouble to become in any real sense a local expert. He has the means of obtaining unbiassed information and formulating a sane judgment. But ignorance and prejudice often render him less of an expert than the average stay-at-home politician who feels some slight interest in the question. In America, according to Mr. H. G. Wells, "usually one is told with great gravity that the problem of colour is one of the most difficult that we have to consider, and the conversation then breaks up into discursive anecdotes and statements about black people. One man will dwell upon the uncontrollable violence of a black man's evil passions (in Jamaica and Barbados coloured people form an overwhelming proportion of the population, and they have behaved in an exemplary fashion for the last thirty years); another will dilate upon the incredible stupidity of the full-blooded negro (during my stay in New York the prize for oratory at Columbia University, oratory which was the one redeeming charm of Daniel Webster, was awarded to a Zulu of unmitigated blackness); a third will speak of his physical offensiveness, his peculiar smell, which necessitates his social isolation (most well-to-do Southerners are brought up by negro 'mammies'). . . ." "My globe-trotting impudence" (he continues) "will seem, no doubt, to mount to its zenith when I declare that hardly any Americans at all seem to be in possession of the elementary facts in relation to this question" (*The Future in America*, pp. 261–262).

petent, untrustworthy, and treacherous neighbours, to pronounce as judges in their own cause. The factory owners of the mid-nineteenth century were not necessarily of worse disposition than their average contemporaries, but the nation had to take from their hands the right to deal as they chose with their factory children and even to some extent with their adult hands. The native by the side of the colonial is in many ways as helpless as a child among adults, and worse handicapped than the child in that he has no superficial attractiveness, his vices—cunning, laziness, treachery, blood-thirstiness perhaps—being the qualities in him of which the white man is naturally most fully cognisant. The factory question and the colonial question have features in common. No more in the one case than in the other can we allow temporary interests and local or party interests to override the permanent interests of humanity.

In justice, however, to the colonial, it must be admitted that it is not always a policy of mere selfishness which calls into being hostile legislation detrimental to the interests of the coloured alien. The white man realises that the future of the world lies mainly with him and his. Even when his utterances are most brutally contrary to the spirit of justice, it is possible that he is following, to some extent, unformulated dictates of an instinct for the good of humanity which, one-

sided though they may be, are yet not wholly without justification. For as guardians of the habitable earth we cannot without neglect of our responsibilities allow the unoccupied lands in America and Australia to be filled up by a rapidly increasing population of Indians and Chinese to the exclusion of the descendants of our own race. Such a policy of *laissez-faire*, by permitting the level of civilisation to fall far below what it might be with the European stock spreading as widely as character and climate will allow, would rightfully expose us to the bitter comments of future generations.

This whole question, however, of the economic relations of populations that have accepted different standards of comfort is a large subject that calls for more detailed treatment in a separate chapter.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

§ 22. AMONG the problems of world-wide importance which loom already above the horizon, and will soon call peremptorily for statesmanlike consideration, must be placed a group of questions which may, in the broader sense of that word, be classed as "economic." They are questions connected with the divergent "standards of life" maintained by races on different levels of culture, which, after having long lived segregated lives practically uninfluenced by one another, are now suddenly brought into the closest economic relations.

For the sake of clearness in dealing with this group of questions, it will be necessary for a moment to turn back to glance at some theories first clearly enunciated by the "classical" economists of the early nineteenth century—Malthus and Ricardo.

Malthus's great contribution to economic thought owed its importance to its being the first treatise

to lay adequate emphasis on the elasticity of the tendency to growth on the part of different populations, and to correlate the laws of their growth with the conditions of food production. There is perhaps little in his work that can be called an absolutely new, unheralded contribution to the history of thought. But the importance of population questions had never before been thrown into such a clear light. Malthus forced us to see something of the significance of the insistent tendency of population to expand indefinitely; suggested the consequences of such a tendency if it could be conceived as working unchecked by any counteracting forces such as those which are actually effective; and made some preliminary contributions towards the study of those forces. He set before our consideration the two sets of checks—the positive and the preventive—on the unlimited growth of population. The latter includes more especially the prudential motives which restrain people from obeying freely the procreative instinct, and also the action of vice and misery in making the procreative instinct ineffective. The positive checks, such as wars and famines, are those that slay the undesired increments of population after they have come into existence. Malthus pointed out, moreover, the comparative powerfulness of the tendency to increase, in contrast with the slowness with which

the means of subsistence can be multiplied; summing up in the attractive, though not very accurate, phrase, that food supplies tend to grow in an arithmetical, population in a geometrical ratio.

Ricardo added to the Malthusian doctrine the enunciation of what came later to be known as the "Iron Law of Wages."[1] Generalising from the industrial conditions of his time—when the earliest forms of capitalistic enterprise were exploiting an untrained and imprudent labouring class, freshly emancipated from the control of the manor and the cramped conditions of medieval village life, and not yet capable of adapting themselves to the changed environment of "free" employment in a violently fluctuating labour market—Ricardo inferred that the wage-earners of the community must always find their earnings exceeding by very little the requirements of bare subsistence. A temporary rise in wages would only (he argued) cause a corresponding increase in numbers through the relaxing of both positive and preventive checks—more early marriages occurring, more children being born, and fewer dying as a consequence of inferior nourishment and the resultant feebleness in the presence of disease. The com-

[1] There are adumbrations of the law to be found in earlier writers, such as Turgot (*Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses*, 1770).

petition for work on the part of the increased population would then in its turn drive wages back again to the customary level; where they must remain until some other regrettable disturbing force should happen to carry them temporarily higher or lower. But no such disturbing force could (he contended) be of more than passing importance as a controlling factor in the situation.

This theory held almost undisputed sway in the world of economic thought for half a century. But presently it began to be seen that contemporary facts could not without much qualification be induced to support the theory. The bulk of the population of England was beyond all question working its way further and further from the bare subsistence line. The gains won by science in the matter of cheaper production, or by the concerted action of trade unions with their "collective bargaining" and other methods of industrial warfare, were not all squandered in worthless numerical growth. The working men of England were plainly climbing higher.

The doctrine, therefore, needed restatement. The requisite modification was effected by the introduction of such phrases as "the standard of comfort" or "the standard of life." In other words, Malthus's prudential check was recognised to be the predominant factor in the problem. The

wage-earners would only marry when they believed it probable that they could bring up their children to a manner of living similar to or better than their own. They did not follow blind irresistible instincts. As schools and books and newspapers multiplied, their standard of life had begun steadily to rise, their attitude towards life was becoming continually more sagacious, and their outlook more comprehensive. Less and less of the advantages of an ameliorating environment were flung away in reckless addition to the number of competing mouths; more and more were retained and made the starting-points for yet further progress.

Thus the economist has come almost to ignore the once all-important "Law," or to refer to it as an antiquated blunder due to inexact and inadequate analysis. Even for the Marxian socialists of continental Europe it has long lost its former terrors, and has become but an antiquated bogey of no value even for controversial purposes.

But none the less the Iron Law is still with us, and will be with us more and more if the stagnant pools of humanity in India and China continue to overflow into the dependencies of Europe.

The Iron Law has ceased to hold sway under the stern skies of the progressive North, but under the enervating sun of the tropics, in the fecund soil of Asia, it is as strong and all-pervading a

principle as ever. Where self-restraint is undeveloped, where life is lived easily on the basis of an income which would be insufficient to keep the white man from sheer starvation, and where, above all, we get the social custom that all members of the community start their life career already married, there there is no scope for the action of preventive checks, and nothing but the recurrent intervention of flood and famine can dam back the rising tide of unprogressive half-animal life.

The crowding of nearly one-half the world's population into the Chinese and the Indian Empires suggests how low the Eastern standard of comfort must always have been. But the conservatism of the East with regard to methods of production, and the seclusion of these vast masses of humanity from the main lines of international commerce, have hitherto kept in check the tendency to expansion. Now, however, that the barriers against international intercourse have been in nearly all lands effectively broken down, and peace and security won by European intervention, we may look once more for the impulse towards inordinate numerical growth to assert itself afresh, as new openings for a bare livelihood in quasi-servitude to the white capitalists allow the dark races more opportunity yet for expansion.

Under normal conditions economic wants and

the capacity for satisfying wants move more or less *pari passu*. The desire for more economic goods stimulates activity, spurs invention, and promotes better methods of co-operation; while the discovery of unknown lands, of unguessed properties of matter, and of unforeseen powers of nature, allow previously suppressed and scarcely felt wants to develop freely and insist on satisfaction. Progressive races continue dissatisfied, their desires always by a little outrunning the means of gratification. The existence of the economic wants restrains the growth of numbers. Only with the expansion of the means of satisfaction (such expansion as accompanied the industrial revolution of the eighteenth, and the scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century) do we find the numbers of the population expanding likewise.

When a more advanced comes into contact with a lower race, unless the lower shrivels up and passes away after the manner of the aborigines of North America and Australia, it acquires, without, as a rule, any great change in the quantity or quality of its material wants, greatly increased means of satisfying them. The arrival of the steamship and the telegraph line, and the opening up of communications with the great manufacturing nations means for uncivilised man a vaster revolution than did for us the first discovery of the economic uses of steam and coal. The almost

inevitable consequence is a rapid growth in numbers, similar to the growth in England during the industrial revolution. As actual instances may be cited certain races of South Africa. "Relieved from these checks" (of depopulating wars, etc.) "the Kafirs of the South coast and of Basutoland, the regions in which observation has been easiest, are multiplying faster than the whites, and there is no reason why the same thing should not happen in other parts of the country. The number of the Fingoes, for instance (though they are, no doubt, an exceptionally thrifty and thriving tribe), is to-day ten times as great as it was fifty or sixty years ago" (Bryce, *Impressions of South Africa*, p. 434). Our presence in India is marked less by a positive increase in numbers (for there has never in historical times been much margin for growth) as by a check in the extent of those periodically recurring disasters which at times swept away whole masses of starving peasantry. The reduction in numbers was always temporary, the population returning to its previous level with an elasticity which showed its barbaric character. To-day, however, flood and drought are combated with a zeal and promptness that prevent even temporary decreases in the population except on a scale that is scarcely perceptible.

No exact census returns enable us to state safely the loss of life occasioned by old-time famines in

India; but that of 1770 (which was probably not the only famine of its class) is estimated to have reduced the population by one third. Sir W. W. Hunter writes in 1880: "The effect of famine in modern times upon the growth of the population is almost imperceptible. Taking the whole scarcities of the past thirty years, the Commissioners estimate the annual deaths from the diseases and all other causes connected with famine at 'less than 2 per 1000' of the inhabitants. Permanent depopulation from any cause is now unknown" (*England's Work in India*, Chap. I).

These are instances of the economic changes wrought by the coming into contact with one another of peoples whose standards of life are widely diverse. One of the dangers which clearly results is the possibility of prolonged suffering on the part of the emancipated population before it has adapted itself to the new conditions. It means a revolution in national conditions similar to the industrial revolution in eighteenth-century England, when a people which had hitherto dwelt in self-contained villages, economically independent each from each, under conditions which prevented it from regulating its own rate of increase,[1] accustomed to adjust its output of labour

[1] Marriages became possible only when cottages were vacant to receive the new couples, and thus were practically limited by the arbitrary control of the lord of the manor.

and its expenditure of earnings to the slowly changing requirements of a strictly limited local market, was suddenly drawn within the swirl of an international whirlpool of capitalist-directed trade, and left to work out its own social destiny, untrained and unguided, in newly created centres of population. Misery beyond words resulted, lasting over more than half a century.

In the contemporary instances (South Africa and India) the taking up by the strong imperialist powers of the position of keepers of the world's peace means the correction of one class of evil, but it leaves the ground ready for the growth of other and perhaps not less terrible evils. Massacre and organised piracy and slave-raiding give place to the sufferings which are due to the slow-grinding wheels of an industrial system the mechanism of which the sufferers do not understand. But the latter do not shock our sensibilities as much as did the former. And so we read with patriotic pride and unmixed pleasure such passages as this: "During the last century large tracts of Assam were (as a result of exposure to invasions) depopulated, and throughout that province and Eastern Bengal thirty thousand square miles of fertile frontier districts lay waste. . . . The first English surveyor, in the second half of the last century, entered on his maps a fertile and now populous tract of a thousand square miles on the

sea-board, as bare of villages, with the significant words written across it, 'Depopulated by the Maghs,' or sea-robbers." "The unsettled frontier of the last century meant that sixty thousand square miles of borderland (double the whole area of Scotland) were abandoned to jungle and the wild beasts, not because there were no people to cultivate the soil, but because they did not dare to do so. It signifies that tracts which might have yielded, and which will yet yield, thirty millions sterling worth of food each year lay untilled through terror of the turbulent hill races. The security given by a century of British rule in these frontier districts means thirteen thousand square miles already brought under the plough, growing each year eighteen millions sterling worth of produce, or more than the average normal cost of the Indian army and the whole defence of the Indian Empire" (Hunter's *England's Work in India*, Chap. I). Thus it comes about that the more violent forms of national suffering are swept away. But while we rejoice that they are swept away, we must remember that in placing at the service of untrained masses of humanity our vast material aids to a life of comparative comfort, we are complicating the problems connected with the future of our own working classes, and are increasing the dead numerical weight of what we shall in all probability soon be calling the prole-

tariat races. As it is, it is not a serious exaggeration to describe that half of the world's inhabitants which dwells between the Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Japan as the world's slum population. The problems of the future, which our present difficulties with our city masses should be preparing us to solve, are in many ways but a reproduction of the existing group of slum problems reappearing on an œcumenical scale.

§ 23. Perhaps we may restate the economic difficulty in this way. In any country, however far advanced, we get roughly the two classes, (*a*) the thrifty, who prefer to immediate enjoyment, or the increase of the numbers that are capable of enjoyment, the accumulation of safeguards against future suffering; and (*b*) the unthrifty, who increase the number of mouths recklessly and snatch at any immediate means of enjoyment that comes within reach. The boundaries of the two classes are not sharply defined. They interpenetrate closely. But both are to a large extent hereditary classes, the members of each providing for their own offspring an environment strongly favouring the perpetuation of the parental type.

The bulk of the populations of Asia and Africa (with whom we may bracket the Negroes of the Southern area of the United States) belong unquestionably to the second class; and we get serious problems to face as the result either of

the migration of moderate numbers of the inferior into the midst of superior populations (as of the Chinese into America and Australia), or of the interfusion on a larger scale of two unequally developed populations (as of white and black in the Southern States of America and in South Africa), or of the systematic commercial intercourse between advanced and retrograde peoples (the clamour against "Chinese cheap labour" being extended to the products of that labour, as being equally ruinous to the industry of the better-class labour of other lands).

In the last of these three cases the workman is regarded chiefly in his capacity of a wealth-producing machine, and a very little unbiassed consideration will show that, if this aspect is alone regarded, the hostility to the productions of foreign cheap labour is as short-sighted as is hostility on philanthropic grounds to the introduction of labour-saving machinery. We may forfeit the main advantages of international trade by shutting out the products either of high-grade American machinery, or of low-grade Oriental labour, and in so doing may, perhaps, benefit temporarily some group of labourers at home—at the expense of the rest of the community. It is possible that we may do this with advantage. But unless we are legislating in the interests of the down-trodden foreign labourer, and wish to

destroy the sweated industries abroad, the prohibitive or protective legislation will have no more philanthropic justification in the one case than in the other.

But a member of an inferior race is not merely a wealth-producing machine. He must also be regarded as an animal whose presence may be to us fellow-members of the animal kingdom a source of physical degradation and a generator of diseases; and he must, of course, be reckoned with, besides, as a moral agent whose presence may have social effects of a serious character. It is these two aspects that require the fullest consideration before judgment can be passed as to the proper attitude to be assumed towards alien immigrants, or the best relations to be observed towards the black masses within the United States or the South African Colonies.

The fact that the Asiatic is perhaps an unhealthy animal for the white to live with (in very much the same way as the vanishing aboriginal populations of America and Australia found the white man an unhealthy companion)[1] is a par-

[1] This may be due to very various causes, but perhaps the most important is the fact that one race may be a "tolerant host" of some microbe or parasite which brings suffering or death to another. Thus the African's blood suffers freely the presence of the germs of malarial fever, and the wild animals of Africa are uninjured by the Tsetse-fly for whose existence they supply harbourage and nourishment; but the human immigrants and the imported cattle succumb to the attacks for which their

ticular aspect of the same problem of social relations which comes before us in connection with the density of our overgrown cities, only of course on a scale which may make it many times more serious. The fact that he must also be regarded as a moral agent is only an intensified instance of the evil we must continually combat in connection with the influence, on children, of low-grade servants, or of bad schools and debasing companionships in general.

When an attempt is made to delineate the general policy to be followed out in any particular local difficulty such as those just cited, these three aspects of man—the necessity of considering him as a wealth-producer, as a member of the animal kingdom, and as a moral and social agent—should all receive their measure of attention. At times one or the other element may be so important that we can afford temporarily to ignore the others, but it is seldom true that only one aspect is worth consideration, and nearly always we find that the diverse considerations are closely intertwined.

Moreover, national feebleness and national backwardness are altogether relative terms which depend for their value on the temporary requirements

blood is unprepared. Similarly it may be that an Asiatic can live in filthy surroundings because the particular disease germs which flourish there in no way menace his health; while the European, in much less close contact with the same filth, is mown down by the diseases originating from it.

of a changing environment. The Teutonic tribes of the time of Cæsar, though endowed (like most savages) with a few eminently good qualities, might well have seemed to contemporary eyes as little worth preserving as the negro peoples seem to us to-day. Had the power of Rome been turned against them a generation earlier than it was, the Teuton might, quite conceivably, have disappeared from history, leaving as little material from which to judge his latent capacities as any decaying race in the regions of the Congo or the Zambesi. Can we even be certain that the Spaniard in Mexico or Peru supplanted a civilisation intrinsically inferior to his own?

The nations that have thus succumbed have lacked the qualities necessary to enable them to hold their own in the struggles that were forced upon them. We cannot assert positively that they lacked qualities which their conquerors might not have imitated with advantage. Nor, though new opportunities evoke in some cases unanticipated capabilities, as is shown by the rapid development of Japanese and Maoris, ought we to despair of the evolution of similar high qualities in cases where they do not spring up in a night. The comparatively slight elevating influence of a small measure of Christianity must not blind us to possibilities which receive at least some support from historical analogies. "The Kafirs" (says

Mr. Bryce) "are not such bad Christians as the Frankish warriors were for two or three generations after the conversion of Clovis. We must wait for several generations before we can judge fairly of the influence of his new religion upon the mind of a Kafir whose ancestors had no religion at all, and were ruled by the lowest forms of superstition." Similarly we must not assume too hastily an "incapacity" on the part of the Asiatic to accept and be influenced by Christianity. It may or may not be true, that the number of Christian converts in India in the nineteenth century is greater than the number in the Roman Empire in the first; but it is almost certainly the case that Christianity has permeated and leavened Indian thought more than it influenced the Roman world in a similar period.

§ 24. Mr. Bryce in his Romanes Lecture for 1902 (*The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind*) points out the importance of the present epoch as marking the close of the process of mapping out the earth's surface, and the bringing into mutual relations in all parts of it of the most and the least advanced portions of humanity. In the new conditions thus created he sees evils for which he vainly seeks remedies. "Although the troubles which follow upon the contact of peoples in different stages of civilisation are more serious in some countries and under

some conditions than they are likely to prove in others, they are always serious enough to raise the question of the best means of avoiding such a contact, if it can be avoided. That contact can be averted by inducing European peoples to forbear from annexing or settling in the countries inhabited by the coloured races is not to be expected. The impulses which move those peoples in the present will not be checked by the prospect of evils in the future. Besides, the work of annexation is practically done already. Neither can it be suggested that one of two disparate races already established should be removed to leave the ground free to the other. No one proposes that the French should quit Algeria, or the English India, or the Russians Western Turkistan, not to add that the mischiefs likely to follow such a withdrawal would be greater than the difficulties which the presence of the conquerors at this moment causes" (pp. 32, 33).

This line of thought, however, would seem to ignore certain counterbalancing benefits, which, though less immediately obvious, can hardly be dismissed as being of secondary significance. On the one hand the conscientious grappling with the problem of elevating their backward neighbours must, in the long run, be productive of desirable results to the higher peoples; while, on the other hand, it is only through the stress and strain and

incidental miseries arising from contact of strange folks that the stagnation of primitive and secluded nations can be avoided.[1] Even from the modern practice of migration, under contract, of Hindu coolies to countries like Mauritius and British Guiana—accompanied though the system be by much abuse of power on the side of the European, and the slackening of customary moral restraints among the Asiatics—much good is certain, in the long run, to accrue to the Asiatic peoples. In their novel surroundings their attitude towards ancestral custom is greatly modified by the widening of their experience—a gain which is liable to be overlooked by philanthropic critics such as Mr. J. A. Hobson, who sees in the system of indentured labour only "a subordination of wider social considerations to purposes of present industrial exploitation" (*Imperialism*, p. 290). In the stirring of the new ideas which will find their way into India along with the returned wanderers —even though the revolutionary impulse be attended by the temporary eclipse of unreasoning "moral" sanctions, and the weakening of caste and communal restraints—there must be a distinct balance of good. The incidental demoralisation

[1] Cf. "I think it is a great mistake to isolate natives or place them in reserves, if such a course can be avoided, for such isolation inevitably confirms them in their old bad customs, and cuts them off from contact with superior races which might improve them" (Sir Charles Eliot, *The East Africa Protectorate*, p. 242).

is the more conspicuous result; and this it is natural for the statesman to place in the forefront of the discussion, *his* part being to give their full due of attention to transitional evils. The theorist of philosophical temper is more likely to neglect these temporary considerations in his interest in the world of the far-off future. We shall endeavour to give due weight to both.

As has been said (§§ 1–4) the task of the dominant races is that of so ordering the relations of higher and lower in the present that coming generations may find the world a wholesomer dwelling-place than we find it now. Accepting this view, there are writers and thinkers who urge that the wisest and most economical means of achieving some part of the desired end is to hasten the gradual displacement of the inferior peoples, so that the ground may be cleared for the expansion of our own and kindred stocks. Action of this character is natural to the natural man, and in the early days of man's history, before man was in any true sense man, it may have been of essential service in aiding the elimination of the unfittest. A milder application of the same underlying belief in the superior claims of the higher races,—the determination to keep the sparsely populated parts of the globe as free as possible from the intrusion of rapidly multiplying Indians and Chinese, has much to be said for it. But is

there anything to be said for a wider application of the idea in its unqualified harshness? Here is one statement of it. "It is impossible to believe that even the highest races have the intelligence to recognise the ascendencies and elect the affinities which must govern the future. Still less can we believe that the uncivilised races will develop that intelligence within any calculable period. Must we wait their time and leave them in festering disorganisation in the midst of an organised humanity? It should not and it will not be. . . . Some race, more virile and constructive than the rest, will get the ascendency. Other races, though nominally independent, will take their cue from this, recognising at first by vehement denials, and then by sullen acquiescence, a hegemony which will at last pass over into automatic and even enthusiastic allegiance as time brings its inevitable adaptations. In attaining this result the weak races of the temperate zone seem doomed to extinction, those of the tropics to subjection. What else should or can be the fate of inferiority? . . . There is undoubtedly an element of tragedy in it all. . . . But dying races suffer little, and dead races suffer naught. To bewail the process is to misconceive its import and to squander sympathies which spent elsewhere would minister unto life. For happiness, however dependent for the moment on tottering institutions and obsolete adjustments,

is ultimately synonymous with adaptation and health. . . . Only those who conceive of the earth as intended for an ethnological museum can regret the progressive displacement of the lower by the higher races of mankind. If it be said that we can educate these races up to our level, the reply is that it will not be done, because it is not the economical thing to do. It is vastly easier to displace a feeble stock than to assimilate it upward by education; and if we invest our vital capital in a losing process, a thriftier race will dispossess both our protégés and us" (Mr. H. H. Powers in the *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1900).

"It is vastly easier to displace . . . than to assimilate." The educating "will not be done, because it is not the economical thing to do." May we not accept the former statement, and in accepting it—almost because of accepting it—reject the latter? There are few short cuts in progress once we rise above the baser levels of life. It is the very difficulties that we have to face that spur us on our way. Without the stimulus of pain we should have advanced but little. On the higher levels we are beckoned forward by the visions we owe to our noblest dreamers, and driven forward, simultaneously, by the sufferings incidental to our present position—by "each rebuff that turns earth's smoothness rough"—the two sets of forces combining to shape our

destinies. The worthier aim, in our dealings with the backward races, being undoubtedly assimilation rather than displacement, the efforts called forth to effect assimilation, though at first sight they may seem uneconomical, will assuredly bring with them benefits of no mean order. "The supposed natural necessity for crowding out the lower races is based on a narrow, low, and purely quantitative analysis of human progress." "In the highest walks of human progress the constant tendency is to substitute more and more the struggle with natural and moral environment for the internecine struggle of living individuals and species, and . . . the efficient conduct of this struggle requires the suspension of the lower struggle and a growing solidarity of sentiment and sympathy throughout entire humanity." So writes Mr. Hobson (*Imperialism*, p. 247). And, it may be added—in the very prolongation of the ethical struggle and the complexity of its conditions—calling, as they must, for the exercise of higher and yet higher faculties—we shall reap the rewards of a richer and deeper social and spiritual experience. This Mr. Powers has partly seen, and it is satisfactory that such a writer can (to some extent) be answered out of his own mouth. "Are the nations that have best minded their own business" (he asks) . . . "the ones that have progressed most rapidly towards the attain-

ment of high ideals . . . ? Every new burden laid on our civil service increases the demand for its purification; every responsibility from without heals a dissension within." Mr. Powers' "high ideals" (it would seem) are mostly connected with the material framework of life, and not with what we should consider its essence. But both on the higher and on the lower levels of existence it is unquestionably true that "the nations that have best minded their own business" are not the nations "that have progressed most rapidly towards the attainment of high ideals." The English proletariat has not suffered loss because much of the best intellect and earnestness of England is spent on distant problems, in India and Egypt; but has rather gained by the reaction, on the English middle-class's moral outlook, of the brave work done abroad. It is thus, from the stirring impulse of widely scattered activities, that the nation grows towards moral greatness. To contract its moral interests would be to encourage atrophy. To bewail the fate of dying races may be "to squander sympathies which spent elsewhere would minister unto life." But to work steadily, or at least to wait patiently, while every opportunity is given for every race's social development, is not to squander sympathy but to adopt an attitude which more than any other will tend to prevent our own retrogression.

§ 25. Alongside of Mr. Power's arguments we may set those of a better known writer, who would have us adopt a similar policy of checking as far as possible the numerical expansion of the lower races. Mr. C. H. Pearson, in his *National Life and Character*, remarks (p. 13) that "it might conceivably be of use if European statesmen could understand that the wars which carry desolation into civilised countries, are allowing the lower races time to recruit their numbers and their strength. Two centuries hence it may be matter of serious concern to the world if Russia has been displaced by China on the Amoor, if France has not been able to colonise North Africa, or if England is not holding India." The underlying assumption (for which we have admitted that there is much that can be urged in support) seems to be that the "lower" are permanently to remain lower races, and either that their contributions to the ennobling of man's destiny are and always will be negligible, or else that our main concern is not with the maintenance of higher principles and wider views of life, but with the perpetuation of our own particular variety of humanity. But is it not after all the preservation and development of higher ideas and ideals of art, science, and morality, which should more especially interest us?

If it were conclusively shown that some physical incompatibility would prevent ourselves and the

coloured peoples from ever dwelling together in security and in amity, without evil effects to us and to them (even after the sanitary laws which we ourselves have but partially come to recognise and obey have been accepted by them also), then, indeed, the prospect of a relative decrease in the numbers of the white race might well make us pause. But even then the argument for the expenditure of blood and toil in the maintenance of our present hegemony would be inconclusive. If the coming lords of the earth are to be ethically superior to ourselves, their attainment of political supremacy is a thing to be welcomed without shrinking. Certainly it could not be justifiably accounted an evil to be combated *à outrance* in the interests of the white race of the future, merely because the white man of that day will be our own offspring.

The very next sentence which follows those quoted above from this Australian publicist supplies, unintentionally, the counter-argument to the alarmist's own. "For civilised men" (he goes on) "there can be only one fatherland, and whatever extends the influence of those races that have taken their faith from Palestine, their laws of beauty from Greece, and their civil law from Rome, ought to be matter of rejoicing to Russian, German, Anglo-Saxon, and Frenchman alike." Ostensibly then the reason for rejoicing at the

advance of Anglo-Saxon or Slav is that these peoples have adopted from certain others certain principles and ideas (among them even certain specialised views of what constitutes the beautiful). But if we are to include in one common fellowship all nations that have hitherto adopted (however imperfectly) the principles and ideas identified with our conception of the "one fatherland" of civilised men, is it reasonable to exclude from that circle, without argument or consideration, any non-European people that follows somewhat more tardily the same precedent?

Moreover, if we have done wisely in borrowing in the past (from Greece, Rome, and Palestine), can it be wisdom to forego for the future all opportunity of further borrowing—of modifying, for instance, our æsthetic standards by contact with Chinese and Japanese art, or our conceptions of practical ethics from our observation of Japanese life?

There is certainly here (and Mr. Pearson's argument may perhaps be taken as typical of the average European's attitude on the point) either much confusion of thought, or else a dogmatic assumption of the impossibility of Asiatic and African peoples following in our steps in borrowing what the Mediterranean nations (and not we ourselves) took the initiative in developing.

§ 26. All the surface of the earth has now been

brought within the range of the white man's knowledge. That it will never again, except perhaps temporarily, and in unimportant areas, need rediscovery, and that it will pass more and more definitely under the white man's control may be taken for granted. Economic "necessities" (the term being generally a euphemism for expanding greed) will of themselves prevent any such reversions. The advanced industrial communities are using in increasing quantities the special products of the tropics—caoutchouc, sugar, tea, cocoa, coffee, tobacco, cotton, and so forth. Irregularities in the supply of such commodities will be felt more and more keenly, and will "necessitate" closer and firmer supervision of the producing lands. What shape, it is natural to ask, will the supervision take?

Hitherto the hot belt of the globe has not been a possible home for the permanent settlement of the European. Possibly it will never become so, in spite of the vast strides made by science in conquering such evils as malaria. We must expect the Anglo-Indian system to be the model of the relations to be established between the ruling races and the dependencies. A few white officials will more or less permanently reside in the midst of the dependent peoples, coming and going with ever-increasing ease and speed, and communicating with their home governments with

ever greater fulness and mutual comprehension. The mere problem of legislation and policing seems likely to become a simpler and less dangerous task as the years go by. Indeed, we have rather reason to dread that it will become too simple. Ever desirous of expanding in wealth and numbers, and unable by their own physical efforts to exploit the tropical zone, the industrial peoples of the North are likely to be under a growing temptation to revert to compulsory labour-systems (such as the "culture-system" adopted by the Dutch Government in Java, or the thinly disguised slavery of the Portuguese island of San Thomé). For such a policy specious excuses will always be forthcoming and readily believed. It will be a duty, it will be said, to enable the higher races to expand rather than the lower, unless the average mass of mankind is to retrograde: it will be beneficent, others will add, to stimulate the backward peoples into efforts they would be unlikely to make on their own initiative: the earth, it will be insisted by materialistic utilitarians, was made to be developed—to allow rich tracts to lie undeveloped would be ingratitude towards a kindly Providence. Such cries will not be lightly silenced.

Here, for instance, is a description of the state of the West Indies to-day. "The black races under the new order of things have multiplied

exceedingly. Where left to themselves under British rule, whether with or without the political institutions of the advanced European peoples, they have not developed the natural resources of the rich and fertile lands they have inherited. Nor do they show any desire to undertake the task. The descriptions we have had presented to us for many years past by writers and politicians of some of the West India islands read like accounts of a former civilisation. Decaying harbours, once crowded with shipping; ruined wharves, once busy with commerce; roofless warehouses; stately buildings falling to ruins and overgrown with tropical creepers; deserted mines and advancing forests—these are some of the signs of the change. In Hayti, where the blacks have been independent of European control for the greater part of a century, we have even a more gloomy picture. Revolution has succeeded revolution, often accompanied by revolting crime; under the outward forms of European government every form of corruption and licence has prevailed; its commerce has been more than once almost extinguished by its political revolutions; the resources of the country remain undeveloped; intercourse with white races is not encouraged, and the Black Republic, instead of advancing, is said to be drifting slowly backwards."[1] Para-

[1] Kidd, *Social Evolution*, Chap. X.

graphs such as this will almost inevitably be used as texts of a revived imperialistic propaganda. Even as it is, the misgovernment of South and Central America, merely because of its bearings on the security and stability of trade, has called into being a tentative policy of spasmodic interventions. In the not far distant future we shall probably hear more of the allied question of the squandering of natural resources. The difficulty for the genuine humanitarian will be to hold his own in insisting that such issues be treated as subordinate to the problems of human development and enlightenment.

It is on this ground that issue will have to be joined with the ultra-imperialists. To content ourselves with mere assertions of the inviolability of national "property rights" in certain territories, or of the sanctity of national "freedom," is to adopt an antiquated standpoint which will not bear the test of careful scrutiny. The philosophical jurist cannot admit any claim to absoluteness in connection even with private property rights. Such rights are always conditional grants of the ultimate sovereign power, and are strictly correlative with corresponding duties. The "right" of backward races to do as they please with the lands they inhabit, or with their own persons, though not yet explicitly brought within the purview of the same theory, is obviously subject to

similar limitations; the ultimate "sovereignty" in these cases lying with the strong civilised powers, who will only grant freedom of action to the dark races under limitations as regards responsibility for its proper employment.[1]

All this we must grant. But we must refuse, point-blank, to accept hasty and selfish definitions of what constitutes "proper employment." A region which supports a race of contented hunters or pastoralists (if any such there be) is not to be dubbed misused territory because the application of adequate capital would turn it from meadow-land and forest into a mining and manufacturing district, bristling with prosperous chimneys set between gigantic mullock heaps by the side of polluted streams. The fact that certain tribes prefer to pass their days in basking in the sun, when not engaged in hunting and fishing, does not constitute them creatures that may fitly be turned into "living tools" to suit the convenience of those whose ideals are different.

[1] This is practically the principle that has already been definitely accepted as between European powers, with regard to the occupation by any of them of territory in Africa. See Article 35 of the Berlin Convention (quoted by Professor Westlake, *Peace*, p. 106). Professor Westlake adds (*ibid.*, p. 109): "What is above all necessary both for the theorist and the statesman is to bear well in mind that no title can prevail against the substantial non-fulfilment of the duties attached to it, not even if the notification required by the Conference of Berlin has been made, and has not met with any objection from the powers which have received it."

§ 27. Where the administration of half-civilised territories has passed definitely into the hands of Western rulers, a question of policy arises, so complex that the greatest of administrators can find no simple answer to it. In a new form it is the old problem of the advisability of extending the operation of democratic principles.

Democracy, when the mass of a people is inexperienced and short-sighted, necessarily means blundering of a serious kind. But just as it is vain, if the beginner wishes ever to know how to swim, to keep away from the water, through fear of drowning, until the art of swimming is learned, so it is with self-government. We learn through our own errors. And if the subject races are never given the opportunity of making blunders, they will never acquire the capacity to avoid them or remedy them. This is by no means the least insistent of governmental difficulties in connection with the municipalities, the universities, and the social reform associations of India.

It is not easy for the members of a well-ordered empire, citizens, such as we, of no mean state, to enter into the feelings of those who are compulsorily benefited by being brought within its sphere of influence. The benefits are so obvious. Peace, security of property and person, an equal share in the most perfect of constitutional machines —these we offer at the price of the recipients bear-

ing no greater share of imperial burdens than we bear ourselves; and we find it strange that no alien people accepts our protection graciously or gratefully. We rescue an Egypt from military misrule, or a South African Republic from government by corruption, and wonder at the discontent which invariably follows. What we give seems so much better than what we take. We are so slightly political in our tastes that we imagine we should be quite content to carry on all our business under alien rule if only the alien rule were equally efficient with our own. We forget that efficiency in administration is relative to the wishes of the governed as well as to those of the governors, and that our rule is, in our own lands at any rate, reasonably efficient because it is seldom galling, and that it is seldom galling because those that obey are also those who command. Were the same fashion of administration applied to ourselves in the same manner as now, only from without (by alien rulers), we imagine that we should be content to accept it. But the imaginary rulers who could impose an English form of government and maintain it in the English fashion, would not be aliens except in name. They would be indistinguishable from Englishmen. And our own form of administration, though seemingly the best, may well (despite all expectation) prove, if imposed on other peoples,

distinctly galling, and therefore inefficient; just as English parliamentary institutions are a grotesque failure when clumsily adopted by people of different hereditary training.

We, the strong, give; but we also take away. The very necessity of acknowledging the white ruler's superiority in some points involves in itself a loss of dignity and self-respect. A people grows in manhood by the slow and often bungling development, from within, of an imperfect system of citizenship better than by unwilling submission to an abstractly superior system forcibly imposed from without. As Mr. Hobson puts it, "in the progress of humanity, the services of nationality, as a means of education and self-development, will be recognised as of such supreme importance that nothing short of direct physical necessity in self-defence can justify the extinction of a nation. In a word, it will be recognised that 'le grand crime international est de détruire une nationalité.'"[1]

The average Englishman believes that he has no wish to meddle in politics—except to prevent the vexatious meddling of others with his private business. The average English government is equally convinced that it does its best to avoid meddling with the institutions of other peoples—except when forced to do so in order to prevent

[1] Mr. J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, pp. 247–8.

the annoying interference of brigands or blackmailers with the "legitimate" course of trade; the word "legitimate" here meaning "compatible with English ideas of what will work out best on the whole." Yet we find in Egypt an oppressed nation, recently freed from the control of a government of extortioners, rallying to the call of a pro-Turkey party. What does it all mean? It is best frankly to admit that we cannot understand. We would fain fall back on that blessed word "fanaticism." But fanaticism will hardly serve as a sufficient explanation always and everywhere. When an Englishman reads, for instance, that magnificent account of Roman history, which we owe to the German Mommsen, he may enter with sympathy into the glowing panegyric of the Bismarckian efficiency of Cæsar's work, but he is likely only to be bewildered by the author's tone when, in dealing with the earlier pacification of the wilder regions of Spain, he writes with something like wistful regret of the extinction of inchoate nationalities. Such resistances are not cases of fanaticism, any more than is the historian's sympathy with them; and no more than the historian's sympathy need they be due to ignorance. The conquered people may know the conquerors better than the conquerors know themselves.

All this we English may humbly admit. We

cannot fathom the minds of alien folk, and we do much mischief through our failure. But shall we therefore hold our hands?

The complexity of the problem lies in there being so many alien interests to be considered, besides our own. Those of which we hear most, the articulate interests, are likely to be the interests of the warrior classes, and the priestly and governing classes. For these, with few exceptions, we certainly make life less *interesting*. But the inarticulate interests—the security of life and property which we give to a laborious peasantry, the escape from evil customs like *sati* which we bring to special classes here and there—are these to go for nothing? Surely not. As Carlyle says, "to subdue mutiny, discord, widespread despair, by manfulness, justice, mercy and wisdom, to let light on chaos, and make it instead a green flowery world is great beyond all other greatness, work for a God!" But yet—but yet—if we once admit the justifiability of such interferences, where are we to stop?

We would fain leave evil institutions (such as those attendant on the Indian caste system) to right themselves in time, without our consciously exerted interference. But when the members of a distressed caste of the mountain villages present to government a pitiable petition, setting forth how, after having always been forbidden to speak

except when spoken to by villagers higher in the social scale, or to draw water from the village wells until all the others have sufficient, they are beginning now to learn that not only do their shadows cast pollution on their superiors, but even the sound of their voices may bring harm, so that silence in public is henceforth sternly enjoined on them, and they are forbidden to take of the village well the water they need, except on specified days—what then shall our policy be? The hardships of their lot grow heavier and heavier. Have they not a right to cry out indignantly—"How long, you English! How long will it be before you intervene?"

There is no simple rule by which we may decide. Intervention is here helpful, and there harmful. We must go forward, holding as patiently as may be to a policy of maintaining intact all such native institutions as seem to make in favour of the higher interests of the people, hesitating always to destroy what is not irretrievably baneful, and desirous always of stimulating growth from within rather than of superseding inferiorities by ready-made superiorities from without.

The gentler attitude of kindly tolerance will often be misunderstood for weakness, and will be likely therefore to create many of the evils which attend on real weakness—evils, however, which though exasperating while they last are but of

temporary importance. These temporary difficulties are those that strike most forcibly the perceptions of the average unimaginative imperialist, who sighs under the régime of a soft-hearted government for rulers who will dare to strike forcibly and frequently. There is gain, however, to the subject peoples in the methods of rulers of either type. And possibly herein—in the alternation of two sets of governors, one inclined to favour immediate effectiveness even at the cost of some little harshness in dealing with offenders, the other readier to risk passing annoyances for the sake of the wider gain which may come from treating the childish races as having advanced further than is at the moment the case—the dependent protégés of England may benefit more than they would under an unvarying system looking to one only of the two forms of advantage, the immediate, administrative gain, or the permanent educative gain.

But none the less will it be necessary to avoid the error of extending over-hastily to our administration of semi-savage dependencies the principles of our earlier nineteenth-century liberalism, and especially the ideal of minimum governmental interference with personal liberty.[1] Such prin-

[1] The suffering due to our non-interference with the Indian *sowcars* may be taken as an instance. On high economic grounds money-lending should be of all trades the freest from govern-

ciples of a mature political life are for the nations that have undergone a long and severe training. They are not for the use of children or of childish races. Our political system is established on a basis of centuries of orderly development, throughout which the building up of laws suited to the lives we propose to lead, and the building up of characters adapted to utilise those laws, have proceeded *pari passu*.

The security which we create for the wilder races against the horrors of massacre, or the sufferings that follow on flood and drouth, does not create an environment for which the savage's hereditary training has fitted him, nor does it change his nature in a moment so that he may welcome whole-heartedly the gifts we bring. Our presence deprives him of his most serious duty in life—the protection of his womenfolk and children from hostile attack. That occupation gone, the African native must inevitably tend to retrograde, unless some imperative incentive to labour takes its place; and if traditional views of social duty have taught him to consider such work as agricul-

mental restrictions, and interest, like other prices, should adjust itself in the ordinary way to supply and demand. But when the peasant borrowers are as children who *must* satisfy the traditional claims of customary expenditure on marriage feasts and funerals, regardless of future consequences, and their arithmetical powers are too slight to enable them to understand the meaning of a high monthly rate of interest, the economic theories of the European have to be thrust on one side.

ture to be the task assigned by nature to womankind (much as household management is regarded in Europe), the strong arm of the civilising conquerors will seem to have dealt harshly with him indeed; bringing (as it must), among other consequences, that "discouragement which works like poison in the veins of a race that finds its occupation gone."[1]

We have changed for the native the line of natural development, turning him aside from old into new paths, which he is little likely, unaided and uncontrolled, to tread without stumbling. Intervention will therefore be more frequently desirable than an armchair liberalism will readily admit. But only experience, illuminated by sympathy, can suggest (and that, too, very doubtfully) the extent or the character of the intervention, which, in the long run, may be expected to be beneficial.

§ 28. Those, however, who admit the general truth of all this as regards matters political may yet doubt whether there is anything analogous in the policy which ought to be followed in the higher spheres of international contact, in morals, that is, and religion. Yet, almost unquestionably, there is. It is better to seek for the germs of a higher view of life in tribal customs and tribal religions, and to bring about, as far as may be, the development of those germs, than to destroy

[1] Mr. Gilbert Murray, *Liberalism and the Empire*, p. 152.

utterly the old before adding the new. We must imitate the tact of St. Paul at Athens, and be glad when we can drive home our points by happy quotation from recognised authority—"as certain also of your own poets have said"—or by sympathetic allusion to existing religious dogma and practice and to felt spiritual needs. Nothing is gained by contemptuous treatment of the less perfect attempts of pupil races to express spiritual aspirations or codify spiritual requirements. Little progress of any kind can be made by those "whom we might call fanatical missionaries"—I quote from Captain Younghusband, on the whole a very friendly critic of missions—"who imagine that the Christian religion, with all the doubtful doctrines which have been hung on to it—as such doctrines do hang on to religions of every type, as time goes on—is all right, and that every other religion is all wrong. In uncompromising language they denounce the religion which differs from their own, and all that is connected with it. They tell men who have been brought up from childhood in it—and whose fathers, for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years before them, have believed the truth of it—that they are to be damned eternally; that all they believe is wrong; and that unless they can believe in doctrinal Christianity they will not be saved."[1] The wisest of our

[1] *The Heart of a Continent*, p. 307.

modern missionaries have learned this already. It is better, says one of the most sagacious and far-sighted of these, in a book which deserves careful reading,[1] to deal largely in comparatives, to claim a fuller insight into God's dealings with man, a higher satisfaction to be found in the Christian than in the non-Christian life, a greater hope in a more trustworthy creed. The missionary should avoid as far as may be the practice of treating his work as something absolutely fresh and without parallel in his congregation's experience. Rather he should be glad to dwell upon that aspect of Christianity in which it appears as the full blossom springing forth on the tree that was there from the beginning; and should emphasise the ennobling teaching which tells of the Logos as the light that lighteth every man coming into the world; for this, rather than the crude dwelling on ideas of sin and condemnation, human failure and the wrath of God, while equally of the essence of the gospel, is more than equally fitted by its suggestions of sympathy, and of the respect that builds up self-respect, to win the assent of those who would reject an ostentatiously alien gospel.

The religion of the West is no tribal religion, casting aspersions on the less perfect conceptions that other races have framed of man's place in God's world. It no longer looks on Islam or

[1] Dr. Hume—*Missions from the Modern View.*

Taoism, Buddhism or Zoroastrianism, as hostile forces, but rather as weak allies, co-operating with itself, however feebly, in the uplifting of humanity. We seek, indeed, to supersede these imperfect expressions of religious aspiration where and when we can. But we do so, confident that in Christianity we have better gifts to offer than anything that the East can show, and that in taking away the Oriental's faith in baser creeds we shall not in the end impoverish but rather enrich. For we come to replace the worse by the better, the narrower by the broader view of life; bringing a purer joy in life and a richer hope, a faith that will help more than hinder, and a life more strenuous, more exalted, and more abundant in good than our less imaginative fellow-beings have yet had the insight or the courage to dream.

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